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I
Hannibal Barca: For Carthage: 
The Right Man for the Wrong Time
By Michael McCabe
A familiar expression in the late 20th century reminds Americans that if Germany won the 
Second World War we all would be speaking German; a much less common thought is that if 
Carthage won the Second Punic War we would be speaking a derivative of Phoenician, not 
Latin. How close was Rome, the superior military force in all of antiquity, to being defeated? 
The answer is very close. Rome’s survival was a mixture of an adaptation of usual Roman 
tactics to face a superior foe and a bit of luck. Rome had met her match in Carthage; however, to 
say that the Second Punic War was Carthage’s war would be giving undue credit to the capital 
city. This war was Hannibal’s war. Hannibal commanded the Carthaginian invasion force of 
Italy proper and won several decisive military victories on the peninsula.
Hannibal was one of, if not the best, military generals in all of antiquity and his superior 
battle tactics went unmatched. Rome’s best consuls of the day were no match in open warfare 
for Hannibal. How then, was Rome able to survive their first major threat to the continued 
existence of the Roman Republic? The answer lies in Hannibal’s lack of support from his home 
city of Carthage and his inability to translate military victories into the conquering of Rome. 
Furthermore, the tactics of Roman Dictator Q. Fabius Maximus was critical in buying Rome time 
to rebuild and save Rome from final defeat.
Hannibal wanted to bring the war to Rome, and brought it he did. Hannibal’s strategy 
was to break Rome’s will, and he believed that once he proved Rome to be vulnerable her allies 
would desert and support Carthage. Fortunately for Rome, Hannibal underestimated Rome and 
her allies. Additionally, although Hannibal went unmatched on the battlefield, he was unable to 
translate his victories into ending the war. Roman historian Livy tells of Hannibal’s flaw in a 
conversation with his lieutenant Maharbal. Maharbal supposedly told Hannibal after his victory 
at Cannae, “no one man has been blessed with all God’s gifts. You know Hannibal, how to win 
a fight; you do not know how to use your victory.”1 The final flaw of Hannibal’s campaign was 
his lack of support from his home city of Carthage. His enemies in the senate were suspicious of 
his success and unwilling to provide Hannibal with reinforcements or siege equipment—both 
were essential if he was to assault the city of Rome. 1
1 Livy. The War with Hannibal. London: Penguin Books 1965. 153
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The showdown between Rome and Carthage was inevitable; both city-states grew rapidly 
and vied to be the dominant power in the Mediterranean. Virgil’s epic poem the Aeneid tells us 
the legend of Carthage’s hatred of Rome stemming from one of Rome’s supposed founders 
Aeneas spurning the love of Carthaginian queen Dido. Dido’s last words before her suicide were 
“a malediction to Aeneas and his descendants.”2 Historically the rivalry truly began after the 
Romans “involved themselves with affairs in Sicily.”3 Rome inserted itself into the boiling 
cauldron that was an island controlled by the Greeks, Carthage, and now mercenaries that 
pledged allegiance to Rome. Rome’s power play was the direct cause of the First Punic War, in 
which Rome was able to best Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar in battle. Defeat against the Romans 
did not stop Hamilcar Barca’s vision of a Carthaginian Empire. After he settled Carthage’s 
mercenary rebellion, Hamilcar set off to regain lost Carthaginian territory in Spain. By the time 
of his death in 247 BC he had “re-established and strengthened Carthaginian domination in 
southern Spain as far north as his new foundation of Acra Leuce [today, Alicante].”4
Most importantly Hamilcar brought his nine year old son, Hannibal, along to see the 
military action. Livy in his history of Rome tells of the legend that at age nine Hannibal was led 
up to a temple altar by his father and binded himself to an oath that “so soon as he [Hannibal] 
should be able he would be the declared enemy of the Roman People.” 5 This oath was one that 
Hannibal took to heart—his family’s name had been disgraced after the defeat in the First Punic 
War, but his father had managed to regain some prestige with his victories in Spain and over the 
mercenaries in the Truceless War. Hannibal saw the opportunity not only to make his family the 
most import in Carthage, but to immortalize himself in history—an opportunity Hannibal seized 
on.
After his brother-in-law Hasdrubal died while commanding forces in Spain, Hannibal 
was given supreme command of the Carthaginian forces. Hannibal quickly made a power play 
that was the direct cause of the Second Punic War—he attacked the town of Saguntum, a Roman 
ally. The Second Punic War had begun, “Hannibal had thrown down the gauntlet. The fall of 
Saguntum had fanned the sparks of rivalry into a blaze and made war inevitable.”6 One of 
Hannibal’s greatest qualities was his decisiveness. He did not waiver when faced with adversity 
and post-Saguntum shows this quality in Hannibal. He did not wait for Rome to bring the war to 
his doorstep—Hannibal wanted to dictate the place and the conditions of battle. Hannibal’s 
strategy was evident:
It is quite clear that Hannibal carried out a carefully prepared plan which he inherited 
from his father. His object was nothing less than the destruction of the power of Rome 
before Rome destroyed Carthage, and Rome’s most vulnerable spot was in Italy itself 
where the Roman federation of states was still loose and the Celtic Tribes of Gauls in the
North were in revolt.
Hannibal’s next move was to make his famous march over the Alps and bring the war to the 
Italian Peninsula.
2 Matyszak. The Enemies o f Rome. 2004, p. 21
3 Ibid.
4 Caven. The Punic Wars. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 78.
5 Livy. Volume V: Books XXI-XXII. 1905, p. 5
6 Scullard. A History o f the Roman World. 1961, 180.
7 Beer. Alps and Elephants: Hannibals March. London: Geoffrey Bless, 1955. 3.
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An essential element to all of Hannibal’s military operations was surprise and his march 
over the Alps was no exception. The Roman’s had control of the sea and felt there was no rush 
to bring the war to Spain. Hannibal, they believed, had run out of territory to annex and would 
decay on the Iberian Peninsula until the mighty Roman Army arrived. The thought that an 
opposing army could navigate the treacherous passage through the Alps had not crossed their 
minds. Hannibal settled affairs in Spain, leaving his brother Hasdrubal (both Hasdrubal and 
Hannibal seem to be very common names in Carthage) as governor, and began his march with 
“90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 37 elephants, composed of men from Carthage and her 
dependencies, Numidia, Spain and the Balearic Islands.” The march over the Alps took a toll 
on the army of Hannibal where he lost a large amount of men to illness, some to desertion, and 
others to fighting mountainous tribes who were much more accustomed to fighting in the Alps. 
Hannibal arrived in Italy with about 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry—a substantial force in its 
own right but one must wonder what if Carthage had controlled the seas and Hannibal had been 
able to convoy his forces to Italy? It appears that Rome would have been defeated by this 
massive force. Despite the shortcomings of the mountain passage, Hannibal made it across the 
Alps “to the utter surprise and consternation of the Romans. Hannibal and his army had crossed 
the Alps which [the Romans] had never thought of guarding.”9
Hannibal’s strategy hinged on the ability to convert local people to the Carthaginian 
cause—he needed supplies and more manpower. In addition to supplies and troops, Hannibal’s 
army did not possess any siege equipment due to it being a gigantic burden to force his infantry 
men to carry ladders over a mountain and impossible to transport the massive siege towers over 
the Alps. Carthage would be of little help for Hannibal, “in everything that Hannibal did, he had 
to rely solely on himself, for the home government at Carthage could not be relied upon to 
support him or to prosecute the war with any energy at all.”10 1Carthage’s senators had always 
been suspicious of the success of its generals and the enemies of Hannibal made no exception for 
him. They constantly refused to provide him with reinforcements, even when victory was within 
the reach of Carthage. Under different political conditions Hannibal’s offensive could have been 
more organized and constantly been resupplied.
Fortunately for Hannibal, the Celtic tribes in Gaul were filled with resentment toward the 
Romans and more than willing to provide him with soldiers, supplies, and horses.11 The Celtic 
forces were a double edged sword—they were unreliable and they had no real interest in 
Carthage’s foreign affairs—the Celts wanted revenge on the Romans and would achieve it 
through plunder. In battle Hannibal saw these mercenaries as expendable assets—very useful, 
but also very unreliable. They had given Hannibal what he needed most—reinforcements—and 
now it was time to square off with the Romans for the first time in his military career.
Hannibal’s surprise invasion over the Alps led to the crushing defeat of the Romans at 
Ticino. Hannibal and his allies descended on the Roman army under the command of Publius 
Cornelius Scipio. Scipio’s army was routed and his own life was only saved by his young son 
heroism. Scipio’s son would play a major role in the events to come; however, Hannibal still 
had the massive upper hand, but he needed to prepare himself as all of Italy was now alert to his 
presence. His next conflict, and the first true battle of the Second Punic War, was now at hand.
8 (Dorey and Dudley. Rome Against Carthage. 1971, p. 38)
9 Beer: 1955. 77
10 Beer. 4.
11 (Dorey and Dudley. Rome Against Carthage. 1971, p. 46)
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December, 218 BC on the banks of the Trebia was the scene of this battle and once again 
Hannibal was able to use surprise to his advantage. The Romans knew Hannibal had made his 
way into Italy, but constantly throughout the Second Punic War the Romans had great trouble in 
locating Hannibal’s sizeable army. The Battle of Trebia was no exception. In the early morning 
Hannibal sent out his light and speedy Numidian horse riders to draw the Romans from their 
camp. The timing of this event became crucial in the outcome of the battle. While the Roman 
infantry and cavalry chased Hannibal’s horses back toward his main army, Hannibal’s heavy 
infantry was able to rest, remain warm, and eat a hearty breakfast. Morale in Hannibal’s army 
was high; the same could not be said for the hungry, tired, and cold Romans. As soon as the 
Roman’s made their way across the Trebia, Hannibal’s forces met them head on—keeping them 
in the frigid water as long as possible. The fight was quick—some Romans fled back across the 
river, but most “perished on the banks of the river, before the elephants and the Gaulish 
cavalry.”12 The message to the Romans was clear: Hannibal was a force to be reckoned with and 
was in Italy to stay.
Hannibal was able to minimize causalities in his first war effort against the Romans and 
had hoped to wait until the spring to continue campaigning against the Romans. His reasons 
were two-fold; first, he wanted his men to rest after a hard fought battle and all the marching 
they had done over the past years. Second, his mighty elephants were not accustomed to the cold 
and he feared for their health if he continued to exert them. Unfortunately his situation with the 
Celts dictated that he march on:
Hannibal was moving. His situation in Cisalpine Gaul was an uncomfortable one; the 
Gauls did no more than barely tolerate him, and had no enthusiasm for the presence of an 
army in their own country. The only condition on which they could achieve any feeling 
of cordiality was the prospect of carrying the war south into the rich lands of Etruria and 
Campania. Hannibal intended to cross the Apennines into Etruria at the first possible 
moment.13 
While Hannibal was most comfortable on the battlefield, his diplomacy and his political tactics 
were not his strength. For Hannibal the sooner that he was on the move again, the more secure he 
would feel. His next move was to march south.
Hannibal decided to take the route down into central Italy under the least amount of 
Roman guard. Hannibal, as has been stated, was quite possibly the greatest general in all of 
antiquity; however, the Roman consul opposing Hannibal, Flaminius was not. Flaminius 
believed that he had been tracking down Hannibal’s forces; however Hannibal was able to 
double back and was able to place his forces in position for a trap. The shores of Lake 
Trasimene would be where Hannibal would spring his next surprise assault. After an 
uncomfortable night’s sleep for his troops, and under the cover of an early morning fog Hannibal 
sprung his trap. It was a short, ferocious battle and ended in disaster for the Roman’s, claiming 
fifteen thousand men, including their general Flaminius, and Hannibal took another fifteen 
thousand prisoners. On the Carthaginian side only 1,500 men perished most of them being 
Gauls. Once again Hannibal had been able to use superior tactics and the element of surprise to 
overwhelm the Roman forces. Hannibal had finally achieved something no other enemy of
12 Baker. Hannibal. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company 1929. 91
13 Ibid, 96.
14 Ibid, 102.
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Rome had been able to up to the end of the 3rd century BC—he stuck fear into the hearts of the 
people of Rome.
The defeat of Flaminius was a crushing blow to the Roman psyche; however shortly 
afterward Rome was in for another defeat. Hannibal was able to surround and defeat the pro­
praetor, Centenius. Two Roman armies had again been bested by Hannibal within the span of a 
couple of months—a drastic strategy change was needed in Rome. The senate “determined to 
appoint a dictator.. .the man chosen for the office was Quintus Fabius Maximus.” 15 Roman 
historians do not given Q. Fabius Maximus enough credit in his role in the Second Punic War— 
eventually he would earn the title of the delayer. Fabius was a pioneer in guerrilla tactics and 
believed in keeping the bulk of the Roman army away from Hannibal’s superior forces. His 
ability to limit Hannibal’s advantage allowed the Roman’s to rebuild, recuperate, and develop a 
counter attack. However, traditional Roman’s were not proud of the guerrilla warfare tactics 
under Fabius—they did not possess the honor of the traditional Roman battle.
Fabius’ tactics had been tried and tested, “he would follow Hannibal’s army, always 
taking advantage of the ground, refusing to fight in conditions that favored the enemy, but losing 
no chance to cut off his forage parties and deny him supplies.”16 The guerrilla style tactics 
exposed Hannibal’s greatest weakness—his lack of supplies. What little supply caravans being 
supplied to Hannibal were often hijacked by Roman forces making Hannibal’s forces hard 
pressed for weapons, food, and manpower. ‘The delayer’ bought Rome time and began to 
reestablish its depleted military for another traditional battle with Hannibal’s forces—this time 
the battle was to take place at Cannae.
The war seemed to have reached a stalemate. Hannibal could not gain ground against 
Roman forces that would not present themselves for traditional battle. However, Hannibal’s 
army received some promising news. Fabius’ term as dictator had reached its limits and the 
central authority in Rome would again be in the hands of the consuls. The consuls deviated from 
Fabius’ guerrilla war strategy and raised a massive army with the intention to finally crush 
Hannibal’s forces in open warfare. Livy’s account of the events leading up to Cannae is that the 
new Roman consuls and their new massive army followed Hannibal to the fields at Cannae and 
then divided their forces. Hannibal was more than prepared for this attack; in fact, he hoped 
the Romans would choose the fields of Cannae due to the fields allowing for a fighting 
place for his cavalry, who had proved thus far to be invincible.17 Hannibal’s elaborate military 
game of chess had now been set on the fields of Cannae.
Hannibal capitalized on the separation of the Roman forces, quickly sending his light 
Numidian cavalry into the flanks of the Roman camps. While this attack served only as an 
opening skirmish, it struck the Romans with fear, and quickly took away their confidence. When 
the battle proper began, the Roman armies found themselves stuck in positions with very little 
maneuverability, which would lead to disaster for the Roman armies. The military tactics 
employed by Hannibal at Cannae have been studied for centuries after his victory, but in essence 
what occurred was:
“The Spanish bulge [Hannibal’s infantry], were struck by the irresistible advance of the 
enormous Roman centre, [and] began to cave in; and it caved in by degress, till the 
Roman centre was sucked as if into a funnel. The Romans went on, insensible crowding
15 Ibid, 104.
16 (Dorey and Dudley. Rome Against Carthage. 1971, p. 56)
17 (Livy. Volume V: Books XXI-XXII. 1905, p. 347)
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closer, and the bulge gave way before them, until the two deep columns of Libyan 
infantry, facing inward, became two long lines enveloping the Roman flanks.18 
Although Hannibal’s forces were fewer in number, they had managed to completely 
surround the bulk of the Roman army. The final piece to Hannibal’s masterpiece was the flank 
by his general Hasdrubal, who had managed to attack the rear of the Roman Generals. The army 
was in disarray, separated from its leaders, and completely surrounded. Cannae was a crushing 
defeat for the Romans, and the closest Hannibal would come to conquering the Italian Peninsula.
Hannibal had once again displayed military brilliance in his victory; however, his actions 
after Cannae showed his fatal flaw. His general Maharbal urged Hannibal to march on the 
capital as the entire Roman state would be in complete disarray. Hannibal chose to rest his 
troops instead; a decision that would save Rome. Hannibal sent his general Hanno to Carthage 
in order to rally support for his effort in Italy and for the senate to send him a convoy of 
reinforcements. The Carthaginians had always been distrustful of the success of their generals 
and they sent Hannibal “4000 Numidians and 40 elephants.”19 A substantial force, but not one 
that Hannibal could employ in a siege of the city of Rome. The aftermath of Cannae and 
Hannibal’s inability to lay siege on the Roman capital city saved the Italian war effort in the 
Second Punic War.
While Rome had once again been crushed on the battlefield, there was a shining light to 
come out of the battle; the allies of Rome stood by her. The main political component of 
Hannibal’s strategy—to convert Rome’s allies to the side of Carthage with his displays of 
military power—had failed. Additionally, the Roman will had still yet to have been broken— 
“with every disaster the Roman determination to resist was strengthened, and in spite of his 
triumphs on battlefields Hannibal had already failed, for the Roman federation remained 
unshaken.”20 Although Hannibal’s forces remained strong in numbers, had yet to be defeated in 
battle, and held a substantial position in Italy, the war had effectively turned against Hannibal for 
good. He was never able to gain another military victory that rivaled the significance of 
Cannae—Hannibal had one chance at seize Rome and he passed on it.
The war in Italy turned to a stalemate, but there seemed to be one final hope for 
Hannibal. His brother Hasdrubal had raised an army in Spain and was mirroring Hannibal’s 
passage of the Alps and had arrived in Italy. If they were to link “their victory would be an 
absolutely decisive victory. Rome was in no condition to recover from a serious defeat.”21 The 
Roman generals would not be fooled this time. A legion led by Claudius Nero was ready for 
Hasdrubal after his mountainous journey and planned an ambush. Nero’s legions were 
victorious, and Hasdrubal was killed in action. Hannibal had no knowledge of his brother’s 
defeat until before one of his last battles in Italy. His brother’s head was thrown into his camp 
and Hannibal supposedly declared “I see there the fate of Carthage.”22 Hannibal would receive 
no more reinforcements in his conquest of Rome, and his declaration of the fate of Carthage 
proved to be an incredibly accurate one.
With the war in Italy stalled, Rome changed its tactics and went on the offensive. In the 
last years of the 3rd century BC a Roman army under the leadership of the greatest Roman 
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capital. Hannibal was recalled from Rome in order to lead the defense of his homeland. The 
irony here is rich: a city that would not lend support to its greatest general in his campaign on the 
greatest power of antiquity, called for his support to protect their city.
Hannibal would meet his rival, Scipio, on the fields outside of the Carthaginian town of 
Zama. The two forces were equal in number and strength; however, it seemed Hannibal had one 
final advantage: he had 80 elephants at his disposal. In what appears to be the only 
miscalculation of his military career, Hannibal believed the elephants would break through the 
Roman army ranks, which were fairly inexperienced in elephant warfare. Scipio’s military 
genius showed in his organization of his ranks to allow for the elephant charge to run directly 
through his ranks. The elephants proved to be more of a burden, some “insufficiently trained, 
were scared by the blare of trumpets, and ran amok among the Numidian cavalry.”23 Hannibal’s 
elephants were a disaster, and he found his cavalry was in disarray. In the main bulk of the battle 
Scipio was able to successfully adapt his tactics to prevent Hannibal from effectively using his 
last lines of highly trained veterans to overwhelm the Roman ranks.
For the first time Hannibal had been defeated on the battlefield, and with it brought an 
end to the Second Punic War. The Romans were again victorious against Carthage despite the 
military brilliance of Hannibal Barca. He waged war on the Italian Peninsula for nearly a decade 
and a half before his final defeat on the African plains of Zama. Hannibal would survive the war 
and spend the rest of his life on the constant run from the Romans until at the age of sixty-four, 
he consumed poison and supposedly declared “let us now put an end to the great anxiety of the 
Romans who have thought it too lengthy and too heavy a task to wait for the death of a hated old 
man.”24
The story of Hannibal is a tragic one. One man, unsupported by his homeland, brought 
fear to the hearts of the greatest military power in the ancient world. Had Hannibal been 
successful in his strategy to convert Roman allies to his side his success would have all but been 
assured. Hannibal would have then had access to more manpower and siege equipment. Rome 
was disorganized and in a state of panic after many of Hannibal’s victories. If Carthage had been 
willing to provide Hannibal with reinforcements sent across the sea rather than having to travel 
across Europe and through the dangerous pass in the Alps, Hannibal’s forces could have been 
resupplied and refreshed with fresh legs. Despite Hannibal’s dominance as a military general, he 
was not the victor in the Second Punic War. The political situation seemed calculated against 
him, and he did not have the ability to use his victories to further his cause of the annihilation of 
Rome.
Hannibal seemed to have met his match in Scipio Africanus (the title he received after his 
victory at Zama). Scipio was able to capitalize on the few mistakes Hannibal made; which leads 
to the inevitable question: Did the fifteen years of unsuccessful campaigning in Italy, followed 
by the death of his brother, weaken Hannibal’s resolve? The answer appears to be yes; however, 
credit must be given to Scipio’s brilliance at Zama. Make no mistake, despite his defeat, the 
Second Punic War was Hannibal’s war. One man stood up to the military machine of Rome and 
was nearly victorious. Hannibal achieved a feat no army had been able to do—having Romans 
fear him, which has eternalized Hannibal as one of the greatest generals in antiquity.
23 (Dorey and Dudley. Rome Against Carthage. 1971, p. 146)
24 Beer: 1955. 82
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II
The Newburgh Conspiracy:
A Choice that Changed History
By Lauren De Angelis
Introduction
“Gentlemen: By an anonymous summons, an attempt has been made to convene you 
together; how inconsistent with the rules of propriety! how unmilitary! and how subversive o f all 
order and discipline, let the good sense o f the army decide.
After mounting the podium in the Temple of Honor on March 15, 1783, George 
Washington began his speech with these moving words. Looking around at the angry faces of the 
officers of the Continental Army, Washington hoped that this speech would sway history. Either 
his men would listen to his wise words and choose loyalty to the government, or they would 
spurn his statements and lead their own revolution against it. In these few minutes, Washington 
held the fate of the United States of America, the new Republic, in his hands. It is safe to say that 
Washington felt uncertain about his capabilities to persuade his men. In one of the darkest 
moments in American history, Washington stood up with his head held high, ready to look into 
the eyes of his soldiers and declare that faith and loyalty must endure.
As the American Revolution was concluding in 1783 after seven arduous years of 
fighting, a bizarre event occurred in Washington’s camp in Newburgh, New York. The officers 
of the Continental Army responded to an anonymous summons that called for them to rebel 
against the United States government because Congress was delinquent in paying the officers. 
Stricken with poverty, the soldiers felt trapped in a destitute state that they feared would be 
permanent unless immediate actions were taken. This anonymous summons declared that only 
mutiny would bring forth change because entreaties and words had only resulted in empty 
promises and empty pockets.
In order better to grasp the viewpoint held by the officers in Newburgh, it is vital to 
understand what was going on in Congress during the beginning of 1783. There existed two 
factions within the government, which caused tension. This tension reached its pinnacle in 
Newburgh. The government had been set up so that the states held the most power while the 
national government remained weak. There were those in Congress, however, known as the 1
1 GW to the Officers o f the Army, March 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick, WGW, 26.
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Nationalists, who felt that the national government needed more power. This need was seen most 
in Congress’ inability to tax and raise revenue that would pay off the ever-increasing debt. Those 
who favored states’ rights thwarted any chances of this from happening. Some members, 
therefore, hatched a plan to use the army as a means to achieve more control. By fueling the fire 
that existed under the army, the Nationalists hoped that they could convince the states to give 
them the authority to raise general funds and pay off the debt of the American Revolution. 
Although the Nationalists were willing to risk the Republic in order to do so, one man stood in 
their way: George Washington.
Washington played the most prominent role in the Newburgh Conspiracy because he 
alone stood between the army and Congress. He alone defused the tense situation that had 
developed due to an anonymous summons. Even prior to the summons, Washington was the 
liaison between Congress and the army. He continually pushed for better conditions, pay, and 
supplies for his men. In March 1783, he could have stood by and watched the army fix its own 
problems, but instead he chose to be proactive. Calling his own meeting, entreating Congress on 
the army’s behalf, and promising justice in return for loyalty, Washington averted disaster by 
placing his own reputation on the line.
This chain of events could have swayed two different ways, but it was Washington’s 
intellect and moderate nature that prevented extreme measures from occurring. He understood 
that he had to play many roles in order to preserve the Republic. Washington was a commander, 
liaison, and fellow solider, which allowed him to identify with both Congress and the army. By 
listening to both sides, he was able to walk the middle line and prevent the mutiny while also 
advancing the army’s cause in Congress. It is irrefutable that Washington made an astounding 
difference for not only his men, but also the government. His actions before, during, and after the 
events at Newburgh demonstrate Washington’s dedication to his country and his loyalty to the 
Republican ideal.
Washington’s role in the Newburgh Conspiracy is not a prominent topic in many articles 
and books about Washington’s life. There may be a few pages or simply a short chapter 
dedicated to this momentous event in history. Although they competently discuss the event, they 
do not give justice to the extent of Washington’s role during these few months in 1783. Many 
also do not even talk about the actions he took directly after the Newburgh Address to help 
secure funds for the army and smooth over relations between the army and Congress.
Richard Kohn writes two of the most prominent works regarding the Newburgh 
Conspiracy. His book Eagle and Sword devotes a chapter entitled “The Newburgh Conspiracy: 
Nationalism and Militarism,” which gives a sound summary of the event, but mainly focuses on 
the situation in Congress and how it manipulated the army to rebel. Kohn does not go into great 
detail on Washington’s contributions beyond a general explanation on his decisions to call his 
own meeting and read his own speech. By not establishing Washington’s thoughts and motives 
behind his actions, Kohn is unable to portray Washington’s indispensability throughout this 
event.
Not only does Kohn give a general background to the Newburgh Conspiracy in his book, 
but also chooses to analyze the supposed conspiracy in greater detail in his other well known 
article, “The Newburgh Conspiracy: Reconsidered.” This work focuses on both the conspirators 
in Congress and their incriminating decisions, such as Robert Morris, who resigned as Financier, 
and the leading conspirators in the Newburgh Camp, especially Horatio Gates. These discussions 
are important when attempting to understand the Newburgh Conspiracy and are quite interesting,
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but do not display the whole picture because both writings end with Washington’s meeting. By 
ending so abruptly, Kohn is unable to show how the army’s demands were met.
In other books that discuss Washington’s entire life and military career, there appears to 
be a similar trend of neglecting a discussion on the results regarding pay for the army. In George 
Washington's War, Bruce Chadwick discusses the Newburgh Conspiracy in the chapter entitled 
“Coup D’etat.” Even though he discusses the event in more detail than other authors, Chadwick 
sums up Washington’s meeting in four paragraphs. He moves quickly through Washington’s 
actions using only three sentences to do so. Not only does he shorten his prose about the 
meeting, but also in what had happened after. He sums up his chapter by merely stating, “They 
left the temple slowly and returned to their posts”2 This ending leaves the reader to guess what 
happened in the days and weeks following the event because he then moves his discussion to 
December 1783.
After analyzing various works, this pattern of incomplete narrative appears often. One 
book, however, did at least touch on the immediate after shocks of the Newburgh Conspiracy. 
That book is Stuart Leibiger’s Founding Friendship: George Washington, James Madison, and 
the Creation o f the American Republic. Although his work focuses on the relationship between 
James Madison and Washington, it also gives more details about Washington’s role and how he 
affected change in the subsequent weeks of the Newburgh Conspiracy.
For instance, Leibiger writes, “In the weeks following the Newburgh crisis, Washington 
sorted out what had happened...From Newburgh...Washington anxiously followed the revenue 
plan’s fate” that could have provided the funds necessary for the army.3 Although he goes into 
some detail that is lacking in other sources, he too ends this scene in American history somewhat 
suddenly by saying the threat declined after preliminary peace. Yes, this is true, but there is so 
much more that can be said about Washington attempting to procreate funds and mediate after 
the preliminary peace is signed.
The authors who have written about the Newburgh Conspiracy divulge information 
regarding Washington’s role, if one looks closely. They do a fine job at analyzing his character, 
actions, and influence; however, there is little discussion about how he affected change after the 
formal address. In order to fully understand the Newburgh Conspiracy, one needs to look at it 
from all sides and understand just how much effort Washington put forth to preserve the union. 
Therefore, this paper will set out to explore the Newburgh Conspiracy in general, but focus 
specifically on Washington’s role after the address and how he altered the course of history. This 
will provide the final piece to the Newburgh Conspiracy puzzle, and thus help shed light on a 
turning point in American history!
Chapter 1
Congress’ Predicament
In January 1783, Congress faced rising tension from the public creditors, especially those 
soldiers who had given up seven years of their lives to fight for American independence. These 
tensions culminated when a deputation of army officers arrived in Philadelphia on December 31, 
1782. This deputation included General Alexander McDougall, Colonel John Brooks, Colonel
2 Bruce Chadwick, George Washington’s War: The Forging o f a Revolutionary Leader and the American 
Presidency (Illinois: Sourcebooks, inc, 2004) 446.
3 Stuart Leibiger, Founding Friendship: George Washington, James Madison, and the Creation of the American 
Republic (Charlottesville: University Press, 1999) 30-31.
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Mathias Ogden, and Colonel Stephen Moylan. This deputation hoped to secure the funds that had 
been promised by Congress since the beginning of the war. It is evident in the memorial from the 
officers that the army was facing levels of poverty that would prevent it from maintaining a life 
after war. Stating, “Our distresses have brought us to a point. We have borne all that men can 
bear— our property is expended— our private resources are at an end, and our friends are wearied 
out and disgusted without incessant applications.”4 These officers realized that they had 
exhausted all other outlets and needed Congress’ help. However, help from Congress had 
previously proved to be limited.
As soldiers of the Continental Army, enlisted men were promised a certain amount of 
provisions that included food, clothing, and compensation. Delivering only seven or eight-tenths 
of the original sum, Congress was unable to satiate the officers’ inherent needs. Also, those 
soldiers who had previously retired from service were unable to provide for themselves under the 
half-pay resolution of 1780, which provided officers with half pay for life, because the states 
were unwilling to support the resolution. They witnessed “with chagrin the odious point of view 
in which the citizens of too many states endeavor to place the men who are entitled to” half-pay.5 
They believed that it was Congress’ responsibility to pay them, not the states’. Therefore, the 
deputation asked Congress to commute this half-pay for life for full pay for a number of years or 
one large lump sum payment. However, Nationalists in Congress, such as Alexander Hamilton 
and Robert Morris, believed that Congress could not help the soldiers without first taking power 
away from the states.
Because the Americans feared a distant centralized government, they created a 
confederation that had a weak federal government and strong state governments. This meant that 
the states had the power to raise taxes, fund projects, and ultimately pay creditors who rendered 
services during the war. These stipulations inhibited Congress’ ability fully to help the suffering 
soldiers in the army. To remedy this situation, Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, 
declared that Congress needed the power to raise funds. In his “Observations on the Present State 
of Affairs,” Morris stated, “To give Congress proper authority, the Confederation should be 
amended. Influence may be obtained by funding the Public Debts, on general Revenues.”6 He 
strongly believed that the states would be unwilling to fund the current debt and also the interest 
imposed by previous ones. To avoid these problems, he believed the establishment of “general 
funds” under Congress would not only be accepted by more individuals, but also be seen as more 
just.
After the deputation presented their requests, Congress began to fear the power of the 
army. The Congressional Committee asked the deputation what actions would be taken if 
Congress was unable to help. They responded:
It was impossible to say precisely, that altho’ the Sergeants & some of the most
intelligent privates had been often observed in sequestered consultations, yet it is not
4 The Newburgh Conspiracy, December 1782-March 1783, The memorial from the officers of the army, [page 290-
93], http://memorv.loc.gov/leam/timeline/amerv/peace/newburgh.html.
The Newburgh Conspiracy, December 1782-March 1783, The memorial from the officers of the army, [page 290- 
93]. http://memorv.loc.gov/learn/timeline/amerv/peace/newburgh.html.
6 RM, Observations on the Present State o f Affairs, January 14, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 304-306.
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known that any premeditated plan had been formed; that there was sufficient reason to
dread that at least a mutiny would ensue.7 8
Not only did this response foreshadow the events that would take place in March 1783 in 
Newburgh, New York, but also brought the reality of mutiny to the minds of congressional 
leaders. It is worth noting, however, that George Washington believed in his army’s integrity. 
Writing to Robert Morris on January 8th, Washington gave reassurance regarding his army’s 
intentions, while also declaring his hopes that the results would strengthen the ties between the 
government and the army. He declared, “I have no doubt of a perfect agreement between the 
Army and the present Contractors-nor all the advantages which will flow from the consequent 
harmony. Surely I am, the Army will ask no more of the Contractors than their indubitable 
rights.W ashington knew the character of his army, and did not think them capable of 
overthrowing the government. These threats urged Robert Morris into action, but it should 
be noted that Morris was one of those individuals who wanted to use the army’s anger against 
Congress in order to gain the right to tax. Despite his underhanded intentions, he did try to calm 
the situation in the beginning. Meeting with the deputation personally on January 17th, he stated 
that he had been searching for new sources of funds since October of 1782. However, these 
sources had not yet reached fruition. Morris sought to raise revenue by drawing against the 
Dutch loan of 1782 through the importation of specie from Havana. Not only did he execute this 
plan, but also decided to overdraw on the French loan of 1783. He believed this was in the best 
interest of Congress because the tension within the army was rising.9
This tension became most evident after General Nathanael Greene had advanced two 
months pay to the Southern army after the British were expelled from Charlestown in December 
1782. The Northern troops felt neglected and wanted equality. Thus, Robert Morris decided to 
advance one month’s pay to the Northern army to appease them. This would eventually prove to 
be troublesome, however, causing further deterioration of the faith that certain officers held in 
Congress. There was no solid relationship between Congress and the army. Because of this, the 
army was more likely to voice its concern or even take action against Congress.
Robert Morris risked bankruptcy to ensure that some payment went to the army, but this 
risk proved to be too great. On January 18th, Robert Morris learned that the overdraft was 
rejected, which meant that the government’s resources were overextended. There was little he 
could do to raise funds for the soldiers because his personal attempts had failed. The states too 
had proved time and again unwilling to pay the soldiers. Therefore, he decided to resign on 
January 24th. Although he was in debt, Morris’ actions point to his probable role in the ensuing 
Newburgh Affair. He knew of the army’s discontent and wanted to cause excitement in the army 
so that it could be used to threaten Congress and the states to provide for general revenues.10 This 
argument towards Morris’ guilt is only further strengthened when he demanded that the 
injunction of secrecy be removed from his resignation in late February 1783. By exposing the 
truth to the general public, he knew that he could manipulate Congress.
In order fully to understand Morris’ desperate demand for general funds, one needs to 
grasp the concept of “general funds”. When Congress debated this issue in January 1783, 
Alexander Hamilton talked extensively on the subject. He declared:
7 “Notes on Debates,” January 13, 1783, Hutchinson et al., PJM, 6:32.
8 GW to RM, January 8, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 7:284.
9 RM to John Pierce, January 20, 1783, Feguson, PRM, 7:337-338.
10 Editorial Note, January 24, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 7:366.
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That funds considered as permanent sources of revenue were of two kinds 1st such as wd 
extend generally & uniformly throughout the U.S. & wd. be collected under the authority 
of Congs. 2dly such as might be established separately within each State, & might consist 
of any objects which were chosen by the states, and which might be collected either 
under the authority of the States or of Congs.11
The term “general funds” thus means the ability for Congress to tax all states, instead of allowing 
each state to tax individually. Nationalists in Congress of course favored the former option 
because it was far more simple than allowing the states to decide these issues separately. 
Likewise, Congress feared that the states would abuse the power of collections, which would 
eventually cause much corruption within the state governments. It was widely believed that those 
states who did not agree with commutation would supply funds inadequately or not all. Those 
who supported the states’ power, however, refuted the nationalists’ beliefs by stating that 
collections that had previously occurred statewide did not result in mass corruption and were 
handed out lawfully Nevertheless, the Nationalists hotly debated this issue and truly believed 
funding through the states would be inadequate to appease the public creditors.
Those in Congress knew that this issue required an immediate decision because it was 
brought up by a public creditor who had the power to force the issue, namely the army. On 
January 28, 1783, James Madison rose and stated “the patience of the army has been equal to 
their bravery, but that patience must have its limits; and the result of despair can not be foreseen, 
nor ought to be risked.”12 This statement shows Congress’ fear. The ensuing debates 
concentrated heavily on appeasing them. By the end of January, Congress decided to appoint a 
committee consisting of Samuel Osgood, Thomas Fitzsimons, John Lewis Gervais, Alexander 
Hamilton, and James Wilson, which began calculating the cost of commutation.
In early February, Congress focused on establishing a commutation that would be 
acceptable to the majority of states. The committee decided to grant five years full pay, which 
would equal to half pay for life. However, other members of Congress debated this resolution. 
Other possible options emerged; including 5 lA years full pay in gross, which was turned down 
on February 4th. It became apparent that many members in Congress could not agree on the 
aforementioned commutation. This inability to compromise stems from the belief that Congress 
did not have the power under Articles of Confederation. Writing to Madison, Edmund Randolph 
demonstrates the importance of this point when he stated, “Congress ought not to raise a revenue 
by other means, than those prescribed in the confederation.”13 It was natural for representatives 
of individual states to resist in changing the already precarious status quo in the United States. 
Therefore, a decision regarding the commutation could not be reached until concessions were 
made by the states.
The indecisiveness of Congress in regards to establishing general funds in order to 
subsidize the debt, coupled with the impending peace, led some Nationalists in Congress to use 
the threat of the army rebelling to sway Congress. For example, the Assistant Superintendent of 
Finance Gouverneur Morris, wrote a letter to General Henry Knox beseeching him to influence 
the army to unite with all public creditors in order to receive just compensation. He stated, “The 
Army may now influence the Legislatures and.. .after you have carried the Post the public 1
11 “Notes on Debates,” January 27, 1783, Hutchinson et al., PJM, 6:136.
12 “Notes on Debates,” January 28, 1783, Hutchinson et al., PJM, 6:146
13 Edmund Randolph to JM, February 7, 1783, Hutchinson et al., PJM 186.
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Creditors will garrison it for you.”14 Although Gourverneur Morris did not overtly urge the army 
to rebel, he hinted at action. He wanted them to use their power and influence to force Congress 
to establish general funds by using the army as a bluff. He expressed similar sentiments to 
Nathanael Greene on February 11th, but this time he stressed the approaching peace as a catalyst 
for the officers to act. He believed that it would “give very serious thoughts to every officer.”15 
Although he did not specifically state what actions would be used, one can assume it would be 
through some type of violent threat. The “serious thoughts” Morris alluded to shows there were 
ideas circulating about the army’s power, but a letter by Alexander McDougall, under the pen 
name “Brutus,” solidifies the argument that at least some Nationalists wanted to use the army as 
a bluff in order to achieve their demands.
Alexander McDougall was himself an advocate for using the army in order to establish 
general funds to pay the ever-increasing war debts. He was one of the few who overtly declared 
using the strength and military power of the army to force this decision. To Henry Knox, he 
stated, “the sentiment is daily gaining ground, that the Army will not, nor ought not, to disband 
till Justice is done to them”16 It is clearly evident that this letter established the threat that 
heretofore had been alluded to in letters written by Gouverneur Morris. By declaring the army’s 
intentions, McDougall hoped that he could manipulate Congress into a just decision. However, it 
is apparent that McDougall did not judge the character of the army correctly because both 
Generals Knox and Washington were loyal to the national government and believed their army 
would prove to be loyal too.
In response to the concerns brought up by both McDougall and Morris, Henry Knox 
responded to Gouverneur Morris. He explained how the army had always been viewed as 
thirteen separate entities that now wanted to merge as one under the power of Congress.
Although Knox did not specifically say how this was to be done, he reassured Morris by 
maintaining, “They are good patriots and would forward every thing, that would tend to produce 
union, and a permanent general constitution. But they are yet to be taught how their influence is 
to effect this matter.”17 Knox’s statement illustrates the army’s lack of guidance in the matter of 
influencing Congress. Knox, as one of the men who sent the deputation in December 1783, 
wanted the army to help its cause, but in his educated opinion, he did not feel the army was 
prepared for any military action against the government. Likewise, he himself believed that the 
national government would provide funds, which meant a rebellion would be unnecessary.
The resignation of Robert Morris, the letters written by Gouverneur Morris, and the 
declarations by Alexander McDougall point to their part in the Newburgh Conspiracy. Granted, 
there is no definitive proof regarding most of these individuals’ involvement; however, the words 
and actions of these men seemed to have been meticulously thought out in order to gain ground 
in the state-dominated Congress. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had little power 
and had to fight against the dominance of the states. It is thus likely that those who were in favor 
of Congressional authority could have used more drastic means, such as threats, to gain rights in 
order to create a stronger nation.
In Congress, there was still no agreement regarding payment for the army, even though it 
had decided to sit as a Committee of the Whole. Concern was rising, which is seen in Alexander
14 GM to HK, February 7, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 7:417.
15 GM to Nathanael Greene, February 1 1, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 7:425.
16 Alexander McDougall to HK, February 12, 1783, Ferguson, PRM, 7:120
17 HK to GM, February 21, 1783. Ferguson, PRM, 7:449.
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Hamilton’s letter to George Washington. Although Hamilton contacted Washington, one must 
understand that Hamilton was also an advocate for creating a stronger Congress. However, he 
did not want to go passed the point of no return. He therefore warned Washington of the 
potential threat, even though he may have secretly wanted the army to help create a more central 
government.
Hamilton spoke of the precarious state of the national finances and the fear felt regarding 
the army’s next action. He entreated Washington to walk the moderate path that he was so used 
to. Stating:
This Your Excellency’s influence must effect. In order to do it, it will be advisable not to 
discountenance their endeavors to procure redress, but rather by the intervention of 
confidential and prudent persons, to take the direction o f them. This however must not 
appear: it is of moment to the public tranquility that Your Excellency should preserve the 
confidence of the army without losing that of the people. This will enable you in case of 
extremity to guide the torrent, and bring order perhaps even good, out of confusion,18
Hamilton shows the importance of Washington’s leadership during this time. For without 
moderation, the revolution could have potentially turned into Civil War. Although this was the 
first letter written by Hamilton to Washington regarding the disposition of the army, Washington 
had known about their grievances for some time. He had informed Robert Morris of the 
complaints of his men as early as 1782 and had been working secretly to procure funds. 
Washington’s actions were always done to benefit his men, which would be seen in his decisions 
to thwart mutiny and save the Republic in March 1783.
Washington knew that keeping the army at bay while funds were being created was vital 
in maintaining order. A problem that occurred was the tendency for troops to violate private 
property. This violation was seen as an act of disobedience, which could have been seen as a 
precursor to outright rebellion. In order to stop the troops from breaking the law, Washington did 
everything in his power to keep order through the creation of markets that would be used by both 
civilians and troops to buy and sell goods. Washington realized, however, that this was only a 
small measure that would only temporarily distract the troops from their present grievances. 
Washington confided in George Clinton, who was then the governor of New York:
In order to put a total stop to an evil which I am apprehensive will otherwise be of very 
pernicious consequence, it is my earnest wish and desire, that effectual Measures might 
be taken to prevent the Inhabitants from purchasing or receiving.. .public property that 
may be in possession of Soldiery.19
Washington’s actions show that the soldiers needed to use illegal and dishonorable practices in 
order to procure the minimum for survival. Because Congress could not give these soldiers their 
just due, they had to find other ways to get it. Washington refused to tolerate this anarchy and 
used his power to alleviate some of his men’s suffering.
As Congress debated subjects ranging from a 25-year impost to dividing up the creditors 
in order to pay, the situation became more severe. Because they could not agree, the soldiers 
were forced to wait in a state of limbo. Hamilton, who was a veteran of the army and a close
18 AH to GW, February 13, 1783, Syrett, PAH, 3:254.
19 GW to George Clinton, February 17, 1783. Fitzpatrick, WGW, 26.
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correspondent of Washington, told Congress about the growing ill will of the army towards both 
Congress and Washington. Stating:
He knew Genl. Washington intimately & perfectly, that his extreme reserve, mixed 
sometimes with a degree of asperity of temper both of which were said to have increased 
of late, had contributed to the decline of his popularity; but that his virtue patriotism & 
his firmness would it might be depended upon never yield to any dishonorable or disloyal
20plans into which he might be called.
Congress was sure that Washington would remain loyal; however, the concern for the army’s 
intentions was still present. Unless they came to a decision soon, they would face a major threat 
that they hoped Washington would be able to extinguish.
During this tense time, Alexander McDougall sent another letter to General Knox under 
the name of Brutus. He spoke of Congress’ fear and possible actions toward the army, if peace 
were made with Britain. He stated that Congress was indeed scared of the possible repercussions 
of a strong, central army during a time of peace. Therefore, he believed that “an attempt is soon 
to be made to split the Army into detachments to prevent their being formidable.”*21 If this split 
did in fact occur, McDougall felt that the states would cancel their militia debt. The 
inconsistency of payment from the states drove McDougall to his conclusions. In the face of 
these hard decisions, he felt it was nearly impossible to advise the army on how to achieve their 
goals.
The situation in Congress became disastrous when Robert Morris’ resignation was 
published on February 26th. As previously mentioned, Robert Morris resigned after his actions to 
secure funds failed, but his resignation was not yet made public in order to avoid hysteria among 
both civilians, and more important, the army. His resignation brought about a financial crisis that 
seemed insurmountable due to the amount of credit Morris held. Without this man in office, 
many spectators felt that the republican experiment was near its end. Sir Guy Carlton, a British 
authority in New York, wrote to Thomas Townshend, the British Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs: “’The manner and his language.. .seem connected with the [army] petition and to be part 
of the same plan, tending to place General Washington at the head of all power.”22 This 
statement enforces the rumors that were circulating regarding Robert Morris’ actions. By 
removing himself from power, Morris hoped to cause a panic that would in fact help Congress 
gain power; however his actions could have also caused the downfall of the republic.
Members of Congress feared the worst, especially with the publication of the resignation 
of Morris and increasing rumors regarding the army’s intentions to refuse dispersion. Joseph 
Jones, a Congressman from Virginia, wrote to Washington about his fears and concerns:
That when once all confidence between the civil and military authority is lost by 
intemperate conduct, or an assumption of improper power, especially by the military 
body, the Rubicon is crossed, and to retreat will be very difficult for the fears and 
jealousies that will unavoidably subsist between the two bodies.23
The working relationship between members of Congress and the army was clearly at stake in this 
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trust or work with them again. By writing to Washington, Jones hoped to save the relationship 
that had remained in tact since the outset of the war. Washington again is seen as the only 
individual who was capable of using the advice of Congress and help the army to understand the 
financial constraints they were under.
Chapter 2
Washington: The Liaison
Washington himself was frustrated with the lack of control and power he had in regards 
to ensuring payment for his men. He wrote to Hamilton “that the public interest might be 
benefited, if the Commander in Chief of the Army was let more into the political & pecuniary 
state of our affairs than he is.”24 Washington knew that his status as commander of the 
Continental Army made it difficult for him to remain moderate because he did in fact want to 
help his men, but did not have the power to do so. He felt extreme anguish about the army’s 
sufferings and the inability of Congress to decide how to alleviate them. Nevertheless, he did not 
lose faith in the army. He believed, “If there is such a disposition shewn as prudence & policy 
dictates, to do justice, your apprehensions, in case of Peace, are greater than there is cause for.”25 
Although Hamilton may have had concerns about the allegiance of the army, Washington did 
not. Washington did, however, emphasize that Congress did need to keep an open mind to all 
concerns that the army had or else destroy everything that had been accomplished in the previous 
eight years.
Following Washington’s advice, Congress tried to make a compromise on March 6th, 
which attempted to give Congress the ability to raise revenue while appeasing the reluctance of 
the states. Prior to this day, Congress had created a sub-committee to draft a revenue plan, which 
embodied a “5 percent ad valorem impost on virtually all imported goods as well as prize ships 
and their cargoes.”26 Not only would there be an impost, but also revenues from tariffs on wine, 
brandy, and rum, which would go directly to Congress. However, the states maintained the 
ability to create their own taxes in order to increase revenue. This compromise would allow 
revenue to be raised annually in order to pay the debt. Although this seemed like a plausible 
solution to the problem of wartime debt, Nationalists in Congress disliked the idea not only 
because it favored the states too heavily, but also went against the provisions of credit.
Robert Morris responded to Congress’ compromise by asserting that public creditors had 
the right to ask for their payment up front on a specific date. They did not, under the law, have to 
wait for the debt to be paid over a number of years. He stated, the “Government have no Right to 
oblige Creditors to commute their Debts for any Thing else. Any Revenues for the public Credit 
must be such that Money may be borrowed on them to pay those to whom it is due”27 He then 
listed issues he saw in this compromise that threatened the ability of the debt to be paid. This list 
included punctuality of payment, for whom the payments were intended, and the inability of 
Congress to send collectors.
During this heated debate in Congress, a letter arrived from General Washington 
addressed to Robert Morris. Expressing his fear that the mood of the army was worsening as
24 GW to AH, March 4, 1783. Syrett, PAH, 3:276.
25 Ibid
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days progressed, he stated, “as danger becomes further removed from them their feelings seem to 
be more callous to those noble Sentiments with which I could wish to see them inspired.”28 
These fears became alarming after an anonymous summons circulated throughout the Newburgh 
encampment on March 10th, which called for a meeting of the officers on Tuesday, March 1l th, 
in order to respond to the problems that arose from their lack of payment.
The anonymous letter was written by a Brigadier General named John Armstrong. He 
was one of the more radical members involved in the Newburgh Conspiracy because he in fact 
wanted the army to rise up against Congress. In his first Newburgh Address, he spoke of the 
government’s lack of care towards the army. He asked the men if they could “consent to wade 
through the vile mire of dependency, and owe the miserable remnant of that life to charity, which 
has hitherto been spent in honor?”29 These strong words strengthened the growing dissatisfaction 
of the army. Following these words, he demanded that these men give Congress an ultimatum. 
Armstrong asserted that the army would remain true if Congress followed through with the 
demands of the December deputation; however, if it did not, then the army would find an 
alternative way to achieve its ends. Armstrong stated, “If peace, that nothing shall separate them 
[Congress] from your arms but death; if war, that courting auspices, and inviting the direction of 
your illustrious leader, you will retire to some unsettled country, smile in your turn, and ‘mock 
when their [Congress’s] fear cometh on’”30 31These were sober threats that Washington took 
seriously because he knew that mutiny had been a possibility for some time.
On March 11, 1783, Washington’s General Orders demonstrated his complete control of 
the situation. Having read the summons of this anonymous individual, Washington did 
everything he could to defuse the feelings the letter brought. He did not want to silence the 
officers by denying them their chance to speak their minds because he knew that this would only 
further inhibit progress. He called his own meeting, which he had the power to control, so that 
the situation did not get out of hand. Washington stipulated in his orders that “his duty as well as 
his reputation and true interest of the Army requires his disapprobation of such disorderly
proceedings,” therefore a meeting would be held on that Saturday at noon.
Those in command at Newburgh knew that the course of history hung on this meeting. 
This fear can be seen in the letter General Knox wrote to Benjamin Lincoln, the Secretary at 
War, on March 12th, the day after Washington’s orders had been issued. He asked Lincoln that 
Congress needed to take this threat seriously because Knox was not sure Washington’s meeting 
would quell the storm created by the summons. He stated, “What will be the result? God only 
knows- Congress ought not to lose a moment in bringing the affairs of the army to a decision.” 32 
Not only can one see alarm in Knox’s writings, but also in Washington’s. On the same 
day Knox wrote to Lincoln, Washington wrote to the President of Congress. He informed the 
president that the army had planned an unauthorized meeting in which to discuss possible action 
against Congress. Washington told him that he was doing everything possible to aid the 
situation; however, he asked for the president’s help. He declared:
I have nothing further to add, except a Wish, that the measures I have taken to dissipate a 
Storm, which had gathered so suddenly and unexpectedly, may be acceptable to
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Congress.. .that Congress have the best Intentions of doing ample Justice to the Army, as 
soon as Circumstances will possibly admit.33
Washington did indeed try to help this matter the best way that he could at the camp, but he 
knew he needed Congress’ help. He expected that the government would take this warning 
seriously and take action. In another letter addressed to Congress, he asked outright for 
immediate aid. He warned the members of Congress that if the army had met without approval, 
then they would have come to a decision that was too inconceivable to describe. Further to 
emphasize what needed to be done in order to avoid such occurrences, Washington stated, “if 
they [the army] are turned loose without liquidation of accts, and an assurance of that justice to 
which they are so worthily entitled,” then the men had no other option, but to rebel.34 
Washington fought for his men, and did not allow Congress to forget the heroic acts that they 
had performed, which had earned them the right for pay.
Although this summons was circulated at the Newburgh encampment, Washington was 
aware that it did not originate within its confines. He realized that with the arrival of Armstrong 
from Philadelphia also came the arrival of the summons. Therefore, it was likely that Armstrong 
was the culprit. Though Washington did not divulge his hypothesis, he did allude to it in a letter 
written to Jones. Not only did Washington accuse Armstrong in this letter, but also members of 
the Continental Congress, such as Robert and Gourveneur Morris, for their alleged involvement. 
He declared:
That some members of Congress wished the Measure might take effect, in order to 
compel the Public, particularly the delinquent States, to do justice... it is generally 
believ’d the Scheme was not only planned, but also digested in Philadelphia; and that 
some people have been playing a double game; spreading at the Camp and in 
Philadelphia Reports and raising jealousies equally void of Foundation.35
Washington seemed disgusted with these facts because he was trying to be the moderate leader 
who would keep this republican experiment from falling apart. If Congress did not support him 
in this endeavor, then there would be no hope. He had faith that Congress could help these 
soldiers while also solving the budget problem. They did not need to resort to underhanded and 
dangerous tactics to do so.
On March 13th, Washington disclosed to the army the resolutions that Congress had made 
on January 25, 1783. Reaffirming their rights to pay and security, these resolutions should have 
helped appease the army. Washington wanted to instill trust in the army regarding Congress’ 
abilities. As Saturday approached, the day of the meeting, he hoped that the army would 
contemplate these resolutions and would realize that being honorable and loyal was the right 
thing to do. Although he was not sure that this plan would work, Washington carefully thought 
out his actions in order to keep the army from outright rebellion against the government.
Finally, Saturday March 15, 1783 arrived. It must have been a day of tension and 
apprehension for both the commanding officers and the men. At the meeting, which began at 
noon, General Gates presided. Although Gates was a general under Washington, his role in the 
Newburgh Conspiracy must also be observed because he was a prominent member of it. He was 
chosen by Congress to lead the mutiny, which he believed would help him take power from his
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adversary: Washington. Even though Gates presided over this meeting, he was in no way 
helping.36
When the meeting began, Washington who, in a dramatic fashion, walked in to the 
assembly hall and stood at a podium in order to deliver his speech. Washington was not a fine 
orator like many of his peers, but he carefully prepared his speeches to properly convey his point. 
He began by formally addressing the anonymous summons. Washington stated:
the Author of the Address, should have had more charity than to mark for Suspicion, the 
man who should recommend moderation and longer forbearance...But he had another 
plan... in which... love of Country have no part; and he was right, to insinuate the darkest 
suspicion, to effect the blackest designs.37
Washington juxtaposed his character with that of the author. He wanted to emphasize the fact 
that he himself was for the country and for his men whereas this author was selfish and did not 
understand the repercussions of the acts he wished the army to take. It appears Washington used 
this language to show the officers how this author did not know what was best for the army, and 
instead illustrated how he knew what needed to be done. Washington called himself the army’s 
“faithful friend.” He could have said commander or leader, but he saw himself as one with them. 
He suffered with them and truly wanted to help them. Throughout his entire speech, Washington 
reaffirmed that belief.
Not only did he continually affirm his allegiance to the army, he also pledged that 
Congress would provide for them. He stated:
I cannot conclude this Address.. .without giving it as my decided opinion, that the Honble 
Body, entertain exalted sentiments of the Services of the Army; and, from a full 
conviction of its merits and sufferings, will do it compleat justice.38
Washington confirmed that he had no doubts in his mind that Congress understood the suffering 
of the soldiers. He promised them that Congress would pull through their budget problems and 
succeed in giving them fair compensation. All he asked of his men was patience because 
Congress was a slow governing body and to trust in his judgment. After all the years he had 
served them, Washington hoped that they would listen to him.
To close his speech, Washington asked them to think about the repercussions of their 
actions. He did not want them to ruin their reputation as a loyal army. He implored, “in your 
favor, let me entreat you, Gentlemen, on your part, not to take any measures, which, viewed in 
the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity, and sully the glory you have hitherto 
maintained.”39 Washington believed strongly in the integrity of his army and hoped that these 
words were enough to convince them to change their minds and take a more moderate course.
His thought out speech asserted his opinion strongly, without alienating himself from his 
men. The officers, however, were unmoved. After his formal speech was delivered, Washington 
pulled out a letter from Joseph Jones that spoke of Congress’ resolve to help the soldiers. As he 
did this, he dramatically pulled out his glasses, which he received from his doctor a few months 
prior to this event and murmured, ‘“he had grown gray in their service, and now found himself 
growing blind’”40 This affected the men strongly because they now could better understand the
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loyalty and sacrifice that their commander had done for them throughout the past seven years of 
service. The men were lost for words, and a number of accounts even state that some men cried. 
This poignant moment was a instant where the men looked at their actions and realized that they 
could not turn their back on one of the few men who genuinely cared about them.
It is hard to say whether or not Washington adlibbed these words on the spot or had 
previously planned them. Knowing Washington’s character, however, causes one to believe that 
he might have thought about what could affect his men prior to the meeting. He had worked with 
them for years and knew what could bring about a response. Also, he had to do so in a dramatic 
fashion or else risk alienation. Likewise, it is interesting to consider that he had read his entire 
speech without his spectacles, yet could not when reading Joseph Jones’. Every word, phrase, 
and action seemed to be as dramatic as needed. He walked in dramatically, stood at a podium, 
and declared these thought out words to emphasize how important he viewed this meeting. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that he would think to use empathy and pity to manipulate the 
emotion of his men.
Upon completing his speech, Washington left, allowing, the officers to draft resolutions 
regarding ideas about what had just taken place. General Knox proposed a motion, which was 
seconded by General Israel Putnam. They resolved that the army would thank Washington for 
his speech and his allegiance to his men. Also, they agreed that Washington would know that 
they had deep respect for him and would not, could not disappoint him. The army then decided 
that a committee would be formed of one general, one field officer, and one captain in order to 
craft resolutions that the army could utilize in order to help solve this problem. For a half hour, 
the committee, which included Knox, discussed the army’s options and future actions.
Although the anonymous summons had wanted to drive the men to outright rebellion, the 
outcome of the meeting was quite different. The resolutions that the committee passed did not 
speak of rebellion, but instead loyalty and forbearance. The army stated that they could not 
disgrace themselves with selfish actions and pledged “that the army continue to have an 
unshaken confidence in the justice of Congress and their country.”41 The committee also decided 
that Washington needed to write to the president of Congress for redress of the army’s problems. 
They saw Washington as a true intermediary and respected him for that quality. The army had 
seen Washington’s leadership in action and hoped that his strength on the field would transfer to 
Congress.
Lastly, the committee declared their disgust with the anonymous author who had asked 
them to do the unthinkable. They firmly stated,
That the officers of the American army view with abhorrence, and reject with disdain the 
infamous propositions contained in a late address to the officers of the army, and resent 
with indignation the secret attempts of some unknown persons to collect the officers 
together in a manner totally, subversive of all discipline and good order.42
It is logical to think that Washington’s meeting with the officers had a profound effect on them. 
They went from supporting this anonymous author to completely rejecting his stance. This thus 
appears to be a fine example of Washington’s ability to influence his men. Had another leader 
handled this situation, then it most likely would have ended differently. Washington’s resolve to 
see his army through this storm only strengthened the already existing bond between them. 
Although there was tension between Washington’s use of moderation and the army’s want for
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change, this tension eased because Washington articulated how beneficial moderation could be 
instead of civil war.
In the days that followed Washington’s meeting, the he continually expressed his 
gratitude to his army. In his general orders, Washington stated, “notwithstanding the storm now 
has passed over.. .the officers have.. .given the most unequivocal and exalted proofs of 
patriotism”43 Not only did he express these sentiments toward his officers, he also ensured that 
they understood what the resolutions entailed. He did this by allowing them to copy down the 
official papers if they saw fit, which showed the men that Washington was hiding nothing from 
them. By taking these actions and expressing his beliefs, Washington further took control of this 
situation because now all officers had access to the documents and the reasons behind them. This 
is a further testament to Washington’s leadership capabilities, which were utilized during times 
of great distress.
Although Washington admitted that the storm had now passed over the men, he knew 
that the situation was not over. He understood that the soldiers were still suffering and would 
continue to suffer until Congress made a decision. He emphasized these facts to Joseph Jones in 
a letter on March 18th. He believed that the men were “too sore by the recollection of their past 
sufferings to be touched much longer upon the string of forbearance, in matters wherein they can 
see no cause for delay.”44 His statement illustrates the tenuous peace that had come over 
Newburgh, but shows that this peace could end at anytime if Congress did not take this situation 
seriously. From the outset of the war, Washington saw these men acting as soldiers and knew 
they should be paid as such. He entreated everyone in hopes that he bore enough influence to 
push Congress to a definitive decision. Washington wanted to make sure his men got paid 
because peace with Britain loomed, and he knew that the army should not, could not be 
disbanded until they got what they deserved from the government.
In the aforementioned letter, one can see the private concerns that Washington divulged 
to Joseph Jones. However, his formal letter to the President of the Continental Congress, more 
eloquently and fervently stated what the army needed from their government. Washington 
emphasized again his soldiers’ patriotism, and requested that Congress validate the promises he 
had made to his men. He also stressed that it would be of utmost danger to dissolve the army 
without payment. For he believed:
the establishment of funds, and the security of the payment of all the just demands of the
Army will be the most certain means of preserving the National faith and future of this
extensive Continent.45
Washington was well aware of the financial situation that America faced as a young country, but 
he believed that to dissolve the army without such financial security meant a life of destitution 
and poverty, which is a life these men did not deserve.
The entreaties of Washington did not go unacknowledged as Congress now realized the 
dire nature of the situation. Much was weighing on Congress at this time because not only was it 
facing a potential uprising from the army, but also many other problems that ranged from the
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inability of securing further funding from France to the inability to cope with the resignation of 
Robert Morris. The entire state of affairs in the United States “gave peculiar awe & solemnity to 
the present moment, & oppressed the minds of Congs. With an anxiety & distress which had 
been scarcely felt in any period of the revolution.”4*’ It seemed evident to members of Congress 
that there was little time to waste. Decisions needed to be made at once or else they faced the fall 
of a republic.
Congress again debated the matter of enacting general revenue to pay the creditors. 
During these debates, the question of practicability kept occurring. Hamilton asserted that, under 
the Articles of Confederation, the possibility for creating a general revenue was near impossible. 
His position on this subject was not new because he had continually pushed for a more 
nationalized government. Others also voiced a similar opinion. For example, Stephen Higginson 
of Massachusetts “described all attempts of Congs. to provide for the public debts out of the 
mode prescribed by the Confederation, as nugatory.”47 This is just one example of the growing 
discontent regarding the national government’s inability to intervene in state affairs.
Finally on March 21st, the Report on Half Pay for the Army was drafted. In this report, 
Congress stipulated plans to alleviate the suffering of the Continental Army. This document 
resolved:
That such officers as are now in service and shall continue therein to the end of the war 
shall be intitled to receive the amount of five years full pay in money or securities on 
interest at six per Cent as congress shall find most convenient, instead of half pay
48promised for life by the resolution of the 21 of October 1780.
Not only did Congress provide for those officers in service, but also those who had previously 
retired. They too would receive payment “collectively in each state of which they are 
inhabitants”49 It seemed that Congress was making every effort to help all those men who had 
served in the past and in the present.
Although the resolutions had been written, Congress had not passed them yet. Because of 
Washington’s entreaties, on March 22nd, Congress was more willing to accept and pass the 
resolutions put forth. The members had the events of both Newburgh and Washington’s advice 
fresh in their minds, which may have truly manifested a fear that would not subside until a 
decision had been made. Therefore, after some revisions, Congress passed these resolutions after 
a motion made by Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut on March 22, 1783. It appeared as if progress 
was occurring.
Now that these resolutions had been passed, Congress had to ensure that the impost on 
imported goods was executed properly and lawfully. Formal peace was in America’s grasp, 
which only further increased the need for the impost. The army would soon disband and ask for 
their funds. One sees this concern in a letter written to Gourverneur Morris:
The People of America must begin to pay taxes.. .Peace is in a manner made.. .now we 
must help ourselves... the differences in the price of country produce and of importations 
must enable People to pay with a tolerable degree of convenience to themselves.50
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It was evident that those in power knew that the state of the Union depended on a communal 
effort to allow the United States to repair its credit. Although the letter showed confidence in this 
system, Robert Morris did not agree with Gourverneur Morris because he saw a bleaker picture 
about both foreign and domestic affairs.
Robert Morris had always wanted to incite the army to grab what was theirs and overturn 
the dominance of the states in the process. He saw threats coming from every side and did not 
know if the United States would survive all of them. He stated, “When I make observations I 
cannot forbear adding that if no excesses take place I shall be sorry that ill-humours have 
appeared. I shall not regret importunity...from the army.”51 523His statement shows that he did not 
fully believe that the impost and commutation would actually work because of the states inability 
to sacrifice for the creditors. He did state that progress was being made however and Congress 
had convinced eight states to provide for the commutation of half pay. It thus appeared that 
progress was being made in order to help the soldiers, but nevertheless the potential issues 
arising seemed quite probable.
Although it was evident that Congress was making an effort to help the Continental 
Army, Washington still intervened on their behalf because he did not want them to be 
manipulated by the government. He wrote a letter to Hamilton that spoke of his concerns. He 
declared, “while I urge the army to moderation.. .and endeavor to confine them within in the 
bounds of duty, I cannot as an hon{est} man conceal from you, that I am afraid their distrusts 
ha{ve} too much foundation” Washington was alluding to the continuing rumors that had been 
spreading in the army. This mistrust lay in the possibility that the army may be disbanding 
without first getting their full pay. To Washington, Hamilton was extremely blunt about the 
concerns the general had made to him. He thus replied to Washington by stating:
The army...express an expectation that Congress will not disband them previous to a 
settlement of accounts and the establishment of funds. Congress will not disband them 
previous to a settlement of accounts and the establishment of funds. Congress may 
resolve upon the first; but they cannot constitutionally declare the second. They have no
C O
right by the Confederation to demand funds.
Hamilton saw this as a real problem, but was quite pragmatic about the situation. He realized that 
to have the army remain intact during peacetime would not only cost the country more, but also 
could cause unrest during times of inactivity. Hamilton reassured Washington about Congress’ 
intentions. He told Washington “that Congress are doing, and will continue to do, everything in 
their power towards procuring satisfactory securities”54
Washington was indeed frustrated by the Articles of Confederation because they had 
continually caused his army to be treated with little dignity and respect. He wanted the country 
on a more solid foundation, especially since he had witnessed firsthand the weak nature of the 
Articles. He told Hamilton, “No man in the United States is... more deeply impressed with the 
necessity of reform in our present Confederation than myself.. .almost all the difficulties.. .of the 
army have their origin here.”55 This statement only reaffirms Washington’s beliefs and 
understandings regarding the national government. These statements also show his tendency to
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favor nationalism over states rights because he was tired of seeing his army suffer continually.
He wanted justice and he knew it would be hard if the states still retained great power.
Despite his frustration, Washington was grateful to those members in the Continental 
Congress, including Madison, Jones, and Hamilton, who had helped ensure that his men received 
the commutation for half pay. He announced Congress’ resolutions on March 20, 1783, which 
brought some peace among the officers because they knew that they had affected change. 
Washington even wrote to the President of Congress stating, “The Commutation of the Half 
Pay...will give great satisfaction to the army; and will prove an additional Tie to strengthen their 
Confidence in the Justice, and benevolent intentions of Congress towards them”56 It appeared 
that the relationship between Congress and the army was not sullied forever because neither held 
complete contempt for the other. However, this does not mean that the army was completely 
content with resolutions because they could never completely trust the government again.
Although Congress had helped the army, members of high rank discovered that there had 
existed members in Congress, including Robert and Gouverneur Morris, who did not have the 
best interest of the army at heart, but instead only wanted to use the army for their own personal 
gains of getting the resolutions passed by the states. Washington alluded to the army’s outrage in 
a letter to Hamilton dated on April 4th. Washington stated:
some Men (and leading ones too) in this Army, are beginning to entertain suspicions that 
they... are to be made use of as mere Puppets to establish Continental funds; and rather 
than not succeed in this measure, or weaken their ground, they (Congress) would make a 
sacrifice of the army and all its interests.57
Washington warned Hamilton that the army was not happy about this discovery. The men felt 
like they were mere chess pieces that the members of Congress could play with. Hamilton 
responded to Washington by saying there were two different types of men in Congress: those 
who were for the power of the individual states and those who yearned for Continental politics.58 
It was the division and tension between these two groups that drove those who wanted 
Continental politics to use any means, including the army, to achieve these ends. Hamilton told 
Washington the reasons behind why certain actions occurred, such as Robert Morris’ resignation, 
was the fact that no other alternatives existed at the time. Literally, it was a desperate time that 
called for desperate measures, and Hamilton did not apologize for these actions.
Washington again faced the rising tensions of his men, but these tensions did not 
culminate in another anonymous summons because the army was disbanding. Those in power 
felt that it was not necessary to keep the full army functioning until the final settlement had been 
reached, therefore Washington could begin to send soldiers home. However, Washington did not 
do so until he could secure an advance of pay for his men. Washington thus asked Morris, who 
had not yet left office:
for... 2 Months pay to the Army previous to the dissolution of... I cannot but hope...that 
the measure will now become practicable... because I know that... disagreeable 
consequences may be apprehended unless the proposed expedient is adopted.59
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Although Washington asked for this advance, the government still did not have funds to provide 
for such a payment. The payment would average $750,000, an amount that taxes and the states 
could not readily come up with. Robert Morris decided that “the most therefore which can be 
done is to risk a large Paper Anticipation.”60 The issuing of a paper anticipation was extremely 
delicate because the states had to pay the money back or else face a complete destruction of the 
nation’s credit line. However, Robert Morris believed that the creation of paper money was 
practicable in order to more easily and peacefully dissolve the army.
Washington labored intensively for his men and even convinced Congress to allow the 
army to keep their firearms and accoutrements “as an extra reward for their long and faithful 
services.”61 Also, the army would be given certificates that could be redeemed for an amount of 
land that each soldier was entitled to. It is quite evident that Washington went above and beyond 
the call of duty for the army because he truly cared for them. He wanted to ensure that his army 
was not forgotten and neglected by those in power because without these men, who sacrificed 
everything for the sake of independence, there would have been no victory.
Despite Washington’s efforts, the impost would not be ratified by the states and failed 
much like the impost of 1781. There were many states, especially in the New England area, that 
still felt that the impost was in fact a pension, something they refused to give to the soldiers.
Even though the impost failed, the labor he put forth for his men shows how great a leader 
Washington truly was. During a dark hour of American history, Washington weathered the storm 
and kept the Untied States Army together, which proved to be vital in ensuring that the Republic 
survived the American Revolution. Washington could have joined the coup or could have 
stepped aside to allow it to occur, but he did not because that meant the government no longer 
had control. Civilian control of the military is a cornerstone of the American Constitution, a 
cornerstone that Washington believed in strongly.
Chapter 3
Washington’s Role in Retrospect
The country faced a crisis early in 1783 for many reasons stemming from Congress’ 
inability to collect and redistribute general funds for public creditors. The Articles of 
Confederation prevented it from doing so because Americans feared a strong central government 
after having been subjected to the tyranny and injustice of George III. They did not want to fight 
for their freedom from one monarch in order to be subjected to another. Having power within 
each individual state ensured that this would never occur. These fears however almost brought 
about the demise of this newly-formed republic in March 1783. After analyzing what would be 
known as the “Newburgh Conspiracy,” one should see how close the United States of America 
came to a military mutiny and overthrow of the government. George Washington’s role in this 
affair helped the government and the people rise up in the face of adversity in order to preserve 
this tenuous union.
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Washington was not a man who took threats lightly because he knew how precarious the 
republic was. He saw how his men had suffered because there was no cohesive way to receive 
funds in order to distribute not only pay, but also food, clothing, and other equipment. Time and 
time again he saw how his soldiers descended into poverty and financial depression. It pained 
him to know that there was very little he could do to prevent it. Washington always walked a 
moderate path so that he would not alienate himself from others. Although this moderation 
caused tension with his men, it also allowed for Washington to take on the role of a liaison, 
which is a role that prevented a mutiny.
As a liaison, Washington wrote hundreds of letters to those in power so that they were 
well aware of the dire situation. He knew how to articulate precisely what needed to be done in a 
way that was not threatening. By writing to many members of Congress, Washington developed 
a close relationship with its leading members, including Hamilton, Madison, Robert Morris, and 
Joseph Jones. Because these men were continually in contact with Washington, they were able to 
better understand the mood at Newburgh. Using Washington’s advice, they would be able to help 
influence Congress by showing how Washington was an able commander who not only 
understood the debt problem, but also understood the plight of the people. Washington knew this 
country well and knew his men even better, which gave a more personal incentive to solve this 
national problem. Washington was a truly able liaison because he utilized his influence and took 
control during this dark time.
Although Washington was a liaison, he played many other roles during the Newburgh 
Conspiracy. Another important role Washington had to take on during this time was that of a 
steady commander. As previously stated, Washington believed in taking a moderate route. He 
even stated during his address to the officers that the anonymous author did not understand the 
importance of “moderation and forebearance.” The question then arises how did Washington 
utilize his moderate nature in order to save the army from a mistake that would have forever 
sullied the Continental Army.
The soldiers at Newburgh were extremely tense and angry with Congress for neglecting 
to follow through with the promise of the 1781 impost. They had gotten to the point where extra 
legal action was the only logical next step. Many of the men looked toward Washington to lead 
them in this endeavor, and were angry when he did not. Looking at the character of Washington, 
it is unsurprising that he would not lead such a mutiny. These extreme actions went past the point 
of no return. He believed in Congress and its ability to aid the soldiers. Washington took control 
of the situation by calling his own meeting that was on his own terms. This thus allowed the men 
to formally address their concerns, but in a way that was organized and nonviolent. This truly 
was a testament to Washington’s moderation because he did not silence his men completely, but 
instead gave them a place calmly to state their problems.
Lastly, Washington also had to play the role of a soldier. Although he was the 
Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, Washington identified with the common soldier. 
This was a crucial role because his men could not view him as a distant dictator. If that were the 
case, then they would not have been as loyal to him, and his efforts to appease them would have 
been for naught. Washington established a close relationship with the army by being one with the 
soldiers. One sees the strength of this bond when some of the men cried as Washington declared 
that he had gone gray and blind in service to them. He was not just their commander, but instead
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so much more. He was a mentor, a friend, and a trusted confidant who always had their interests 
at heart. He suffered with his men continually. For example, he stayed in the camp every winter 
instead of going back to his home at Mt. Vernon because he did not feel that it was right for them 
to bear the elements while he did not. Washington truly balanced his roles as a commander and a 
fellow soldier, which endeared him to his men and helped him save the Republic.
Few men have existed in history who were as great a leader as George Washington. 
Facing a mutiny in the spring of 1783, Washington maintained control while not alienating 
himself from both Congress and the army. He did so by playing many roles throughout these 
tense months. He was indeed a strong individual who was not swayed to act irrationally. Instead, 
he persevered using his best judgment. Although the army did not get the funds that it had 
wanted, he did however keep it from making a mistake that could have changed the course of 
history. Yes, the financial situation was dire in 1783 because of Congress’ inability to raise 
funds, but Washington did not allow that fact to destroy all that he and the army had worked for. 
Washington did, in fact, make a choice that changed history, and it was a choice that allowed for 
the United States of America to prosper into what it would become today.
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III
The Peace of Westphalia and it Affects on 
International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
By Steven Patton ‘12
The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended the Thirty and Eighty Years Wars and 
created the framework for modem international relations. The concepts of state sovereignty, 
mediation between nations, and diplomacy all find their origins in the text of this treaty written 
more than three hundred and fifty years ago. This peace, which was actually made up of two 
different peace conferences, was the first attempt at modem international diplomacy and 
formally solidified the beginnings of religious toleration from a political perspective. It was one 
of the first attempts at codifying an international set of laws and essentially provided the basis for 
international communities like the European Union and the United Nations and even laid the 
groundwork for an early American nation. The Westphalian system still remains the model for 
international politics around the world and the concept of state sovereignty, solidified by the 
peace, is still the basis for modem international treaties and conventions.
In order to understand the significance of the Peace of Westphalia, it is necessary to look 
briefly at the wars which sparked the gathering of the congress. The 30 Years War (1618-1648) 
was a conflict between feuding Catholic and Protestant estates within the Holy Roman Empire 
which gradually evolved to become a conflict involving most of Europe.1 The war was also, and 
more importantly as far as the lasting effects on international affairs is concerned, about the right 
of princes in the Empire to sovereign rule. 1 2 Throughout the conflict, the Catholic Hapsburgs 
fought Protestant princes of Germany who were supported by France, Sweden, and Denmark.3 
This summation of a thirty-year long conflict obviously is an oversimplification of the complex 
circumstances which sparked and sustained this war but, for the purposes of explaining the treaty 
which ensued, is sufficient. The Peace of Westphalia also ended the 80 Years War which raged
1 Bobbitt. Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course o f History. 1 ed. New York: Anchor Books, 
2003.
2 Asch, Ronald G.. The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618-1648. 1 ed. New York: St. 
Martain's Press, 1997.
Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield o f Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course o f History. 1 ed. New York: Anchor Books, 
2003.
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from 1568 until 1648 and was fought over the Netherlands’ desire for independence from Spain.4 
After the Twelve Year Truce, a ceasefire agreement between both sides which proved to be 
short-lived, fighting resumed in 1621 and from then on coincided with the 30 Years War until 
both wars ended in 1648.5 Despite this, the prevailing conflict which the peace addressed in 
greatest detail was the 30 Years War, a war which ravished the Holy Roman Empire, displaced 
thousands of Europeans, and killed approximately 3-4 million Germans, a significant portion of 
the population.6
The negotiations known as the Congress of Westphalia began in 1642 and lasted another 
4 years until the end of the 30 Years War in 1648.7 Diplomatic representatives from 96 different 
entities were present at the negotiations which met in two cities within 30 miles of each other- 
Osnabriick and Munster.8 The Catholic estates involved in the conflict including Spain, France, 
the Dutch, the Holy Roman Empire, and a papal mediator met in Munster while the Protestant 
estates met under the leadership of Sweden and an imperial representative at Osnabruck.9 During 
the entire duration of the Congress at Munster and Osnabruck, the war was raging only a “three 
day’s hard ride” from the peace talks.10 123Because a conference on such a large scale had never 
taken place prior to the 17th century, the “diplomats” who attended the peace talks were 
“stumbling over conflicting claims of precedent” and were worried that even participating in the 
negotiations was a threat to their nation’s future power.11 Additionally, while the negotiations 
commenced in 1642 and the Congress convened on December 4, 1644, some scholars argue that 
true negotiations did not begin until November of 1645 when Count Trauttmannsdorff, the 
President of the Imperial Privy Council (of the Holy Roman Empire) arrived in Munster.
Finally, by 1648, conditions for nearly every nation involved in the conflict had worsened, the 
Empire had lost about a third of its population, and leaders began to compromise. Soon after, a 
compromise was reached and, on October 24, 1648, when the Treaty of Munster was signed, the 
Peace of Westphalia ended the 30 Years War.14
Before an understanding of the peace of Westphalia can be achieved, an analysis of the 
goals of the treaty must be completed. When the representatives from all involved nations and 
states met at Munster and Osnabruck, they had certain goals in mind. National representatives
4 Britannica, Encyclopedia. "Peace o f Westphalia." http://www.britarmica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170Teace-of- 
Westphalia (accessed April 22, 2009).
5 Ibid.
6 McLeod, Toby. ""Thirty Years War" The Oxford Companion to Military History.." (accessed April 22, 2009).
7 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
8 Ibid
9 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield o f Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. 1 ed. New York: Anchor Books, 
2003.
10 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
11 Ibid.
12 Asch, Ronald G.. The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618-1648. 1 ed. New York: St. 
Martain's Press, 1997.
13 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
14 Ibid
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Count Maximilian Von Trautmansdorff of the Empire, Johan Oxenstienna and Johan Adler 
Salvius of Sweden, and Comte d’Avaux and Marquis de Sable of France all had specific 
instructions by the leaders of their own respective nations not to engage in any sort of 
compromise too quickly.15 No nation wanted to be seen as weak and none wanted to be held 
responsible for the more than three decade long destructive conflict. By 1645 there were strong 
motives for seeking some sort of peace agreement in a war which cost millions of lives 
including, by some accounts, one third of the entire German population.16 The goals of the peace 
conference for each nation can be summed up as follows: the French wanted control of strategic 
military fortresses including of Metz, Toul, Verdun, Breisach, and Alsace among other areas in 
addition to four cities on the Rhine known as the “forest cities”; the Empire wanted a united 
kingdom under the leadership of the Emperor; the princes of the provinces of the Empire wanted 
sovereignty over their own kingdoms; the Dutch wanted independence from Spain, and Sweden 
wanted territorial gains of their own.17 18The primary compromises of the represented estates at the 
congress were written down in the two treaties at Munster and Osnabruck and are summed up by 
David Maland as follows: the separate states of the Empire were recognized as sovereign; 
attendance at the established state church was not mandatory; the Peace of Augsburg was 
affirmed and Calvinism was accepted as a permissible religion; matters of religion were to be 
settled not by a majority vote but rather by a compromise agreed to by the conflicting parties; the 
United Provinces were granted independence from Spain and the Empire; Spain was forced to
“give away all points to the Dutch”, and other land boundaries were shifted. The additional 
long term effects of the Peace of Westphalia, though likely not immediately foreseen by the 
writers of the treaties, were far more influential than the short term land and power shifts.
The long term effects of the compromise which were achieved under the Peace of 
Westphalia were significant and the peace itself was a monumental, modern, and for its time, 
revolutionary achievement. In his essay on the Peace of Westphalia, Wyndham A. Bewes writes, 
“no questions that had ever before received a diplomatic settlement had been of such far- 
reaching importance, or had been settled with the concurrence of so many powers.”19 This notion 
of an international effort to solve a conflict using diplomatic methods where all sides participated 
and agreed to compromise, rather than a dominant nation simply dictating policy to a losing 
nation, was very new in the 17th century.20 Bewes concludes, “Never [before the congress] had 
there been such a numerous and brilliant assembly of Ministers and Statesmen of so many 
different nations and never had so important and complicated political interests been discussed 
with solemn sufficiency.”21
The peace dealt with many topics of high importance to the European powers at the time 
but, from a modem international relations standpoint, three of the issues which were resolved are




18 Maland, David. Europe at War 1600-1650. 1 ed. Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.
Bewes, Wyndham A.. "Gathered Notes on the Peace o f Westphalia." Transactions of the Grotius Society 19, no.
(1933): 61-73.
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of particular significance. The first of those issues is the religious freedom which was solidified 
by the treaties at Munster and Osnabruck. The Peace of Westphalia “confirmed the Peace of 
Augsburg which had granted Lutherans religious tolerance in the Empire” that had been taken 
away by Emperor Ferdinand II in his Edict of Restitution of 1629 (the Peace also granted the 
same tolerance to Calvinists). For religious issues, the peace was “essentially a broadening and 
a clarification of the Peace at Augsburg” which, both then and in modern society, is of great 
significance. Before the Peace, states viewed all other foreign nations and policies in terms of 
good and evil: their own view as good and anything which opposed it as evil. 2 3 24 James Nathan 
sums it up well: “If one side fought with God, it followed that the other had sided with the devil. 
For the hundred years that preceded the treaties of Westphalia, only truces were permissible.”25 26
Because of this, the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck which dealt with rivaling nations were 
fairly revolutionary. Before any compromises could be made, the dozens of parties present at the 
congress had to agree on a sort of procedure for the talks. Scholars agree that “it was necessary 
to reach preliminary agreements on procedure before the actual work of making peace could 
begin”. Luckily, by late in the war, national leaders were quickly growing tired of the conflict 
and began ordering their representatives at the conferences to make some concessions to put an 
end to the damages which had been incurred by their states.27
While most today would view the diffusion of religious influence in national affairs as a 
positive aspect of the peace treaty, the Catholic Church and papacy at the time certainly did not. 
Pope Innocent X, the leader of the Catholic church at the time of the negotiations, denounced the 
Peace of Westphalia in a papal bull because it undermined his “pan-European political power”28 
Similarly, most Catholics at the time saw the Peace of Augsburg (upon which many of the 
religious tenets of Westphalia were based) as only a “temporary, emergency measure” which 
should not become permanent law. What is also significant here is that the writers of the 
treaties anticipated these objections from both the papacy and the Catholic population throughout 
Europe. The treaties required any state which signed it to ignore any objection made on the 
basis of religious supremacy from both Catholic and Protestant leaders.31 Once the Peace of 
Westphalia was ratified by each estate’s representative, “the role of the Christian community of
22 Britannica, Encyclopedia. "Peace o f Westphalia." http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/641170/Peace-of- 
Westphalia (accessed April 22, 2009).
23 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. 1 ed. New York: Anchor Books, 
2003.
24 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
25 Ibid
26 Colegrove, Kenneth. "Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress o f Westphalia." The American Journal 
of International Law 13, no. 3 (1919): 450-482.
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states was replaced by the rule of state consent”. This new, revolutionary treaty completely 
changed the relations between church and state and established a new precedent whereby states 
would become sovereign entities, immune (generally speaking) from the political pressure of any 
one church.32 3 Conversely, since the Peace’s adoption, Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists at 
least could practice their faith without any serious intrusion from the emperor.34
The second essential issue with which the Peace of Westphalia dealt was the nature of 
war and its intended uses. Before 1648, war was the accepted means of instating policy changes 
when one country found fault with another.35 It was the “legitimate form of solving conflicts” 
before the Peace but, after the treaties were agreed upon, “No state was allowed to be 
destroyed...and compensation was to be awarded to those states that gave up strategically 
advantageous possessions.”36 *Since the mindset of nations thinking in strict terms of “good” and 
“evil” was beginning to disappear in the 17th century, diplomacy and negotiation could be used 
as an alternative to war. While this is not to suggest that there was no form of negotiation 
before the end of the 30 Years War, it seems that official recognition of the diplomats of 
countries and official offers to compromise could not be utilized in terms of a nation’s foreign 
policy prior to the peace.
The third and possibly most significant and lasting outcome of the Peace of 1648 is the 
idea of state sovereignty. Before and during the 30 Years War, German provinces were under the 
rule of the Holy Roman Emperor who controlled the actions of provincial princes.38 What the 
Peace of Westphalia effectively established was “territorial superiority in all matters 
ecclesiastical as well as political” of princes in the Empire.39 The Peace had given them many 
rights which were previously held only by the Emperor: “they could ratify peace treaties, they 
could levy taxes....they could declare war” and possibly most significantly, “war could not be 
declared by the empire without their consent.”40 This meant that the princes’ power was greatly 
increased while the Holy Roman Emperor saw a drastic reduction in the scope of his.41 After the 
peace settlements, power in the Empire had become much more decentralized- a quality which 
would prove to be very important in diplomatic negotiations in the centuries following the war.
The Peace of Westphalia is seen by many scholars in both history and in the field of 
international relations to be the basis for much of modem international law and professional 
diplomacy. 42 Each of the three primary elements of the treaties: wider formal religious freedom,
32 Ibid
33 Parker, Geoffrey. The Thirty Years War. 2 ed. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc., 1987.
34 Ibid
35 Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield o f Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course o f History. 1 ed. New York: Anchor Books,
2003.
Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport
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the introduction of the diplomatic profession, and the recognition of sovereign states contributed 
to this long-lasting impact.43 In the 17th century and throughout the 30 Years War, the idea of 
supreme central authority of say, the Holy Roman emperor or the papacy, was starting to be 
questioned though there had been very little effective international diplomacy which tried to alter 
that reality.44 Scholars of history, law, and politics were beginning to seek out a more effective 
system of relations for states which relied less on a supreme central authority and instead 
diffused more power to each sovereign state.45 The 17th century historian Hugo Grotius who died 
shortly before the settlements at Westphalia believed that “kingly states could only achieve 
complete legitimacy as part of a society of sovereigns to whom they owed certain duties” and 
“denied that there had to be a supreme sovereign for there to be a law of the society of kingly 
states or sovereigns.”46 This concept of state sovereignty is a very long lasting one and is still in 
practice in many areas of foreign policy today including in the U.N., the European Union, and 
even the United States of America.
These three concepts which were established at Westphalia, however, did not come about 
overnight; they instead seem to be the work of the evolution of political ideas over the 16th and
17th centuries. Kenneth Colegrove, a former U.S. diplomat and member of the executive council 
of the American Society for International Law, writes that before the Congress of Westphalia, 
“International law was in its infancy and the vocabulary of diplomacy had not yet assumed the 
accuracy and precision which was to characterize it in a later period.”47 He argues that diplomats, 
if one can call them such during the 17th century, did not even have words like “mediation” in 
their vocabulary which made the negotiations at the peace congress extremely tedious, perhaps
explaining why they took several years.48 The process which occurred both at the congress and 
during the years leading up to it was an important piece in the evolution of the diplomatic 
process and remained in use, unchanged for more than two centuries.
While the concrete achievements which came from the Peace of Westphalia, namely state 
sovereignty and religious freedom, were obviously significant, the diplomatic process and 
profession which emerged from the congress was arguably just as important. Auburn University 
international relations professor James Nathan argues:
Before the Westphalia settlement, there was no recognizable diplomatic profession.
Spies, irregular envoys, and heralds citing scripture or handing out ringing declamations 
were the usual route that princes chose to alert one another to the start of war. After 
Westphalia, the diplomatic craft was practiced by a kind of well-born guild, with
43 Gross, Leo. "The Peace o f Westphalia 1648-1948." The American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948): 
20-41.
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members who were adept at melding reason, precedent, and law with quiet allusion to the
implication of armed compunction.49
Nathan also believes that since the settlement at Westphalia, diplomats and those in combat 
sought “victory less and the achievement of favorable peace more.”50 This shift in thinking by 
both diplomats and combatants signaled a way of more modern thinking which paved the way 
for modern inter-state politics. This was a change from previous medieval political thinking 
which centered around a system based on obedience to a central hierarchy to a more modern 
system wherein leaders recognized the sovereignty of each state and had the ability to utilize 
diplomatic recourses before resorting to war.51 To further limit the possibility of war, power was 
dispersed among various states in order to ensure that no one state would have the military might 
to conquer others without the help of neighboring nations.52 This is obviously not to say that the 
Peace prevented all wars but it did set a precedent and provide a platform for discussion between 
nations in one of the earliest attempts to resolve international conflicts before the outbreak of 
war. The diplomatic form which emerged from the Congress of Westphalia provided the model 
upon which international negotiations progressed down through the First World War until the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919.53
Even after international relations were renegotiated after WWI, scholars argue that the 
effects of the Peace of Westphalia and the framework which it provided can be seen in many 
modem international communities including the United Nations, formerly the League of Nations, 
the European Union, and even to an extent, the United States of America.54 The charter of the 
United Nations written in 1945 has some of the very same provisions which were included in the 
Peace of Westphalia written some 300 years earlier.55 A scholar of international law at Tufts 
University, Leo Gross writes that the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia “constitute, in a 
sense, an early precedent for Articles 10, 12, and 16, or the Covenant of the League of Nations” 
and that the Charter of the United Nations “would seem to have left essentially unchanged the 
framework of the state system and of international law resulting from the Peace of 
Westphalia.”56 Just like the charters of the League of Nations and the United Nations, Westphalia 
included provisions to discourage war and promote civility between sovereign states.57 
Specifically, the treaty signed at Munster specifically outlawed any immediate recourse to arms. 
Section CXXIV of the treaty states:
It shall not be permitted to any State of the Empire to pursue his Right by Force and 
Arms; but if any difference has happen’d or happens for the future, every one shall try the
49 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and history: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport 
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means of ordinary Justice, and the Contravener shall be regarded as an Infringer of the 
Peace. That which has been determin’d by Sentence of the Judge, shall be put in 
execution, without distinction of Condition, as the Laws of the Empire enjoin touching
58the execution of Arrests and Sentences.
This excerpt from the treaty written in the 17th century sounds very similar to the League’s 
charter which bans any recourse to arms of a nation in search of territory expansion.58 9
In addition to laying the foundations of international relations charters like that of the 
League of Nations, some argue that Westphalia was also an early model for the birth of America 
and the modern relations of European nations.60 Phillip Bobbitt, the author of The Shield of 
Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course o f History compares Westphalia to Philadelphia which was 
the birthplace of the American colonies and says that both Westphalia and Philadelphia were 
“the birthplace of a new constitution for a small society of states.61 This reference to the 
American Constitution shows both the longevity of the Peace of Westphalia and its far reaching 
effects, not just on Europe, but also on North America. Within Europe the peace provided the 
model for the European Union in which each state or nation keeps its own sovereignty but is 
united under the larger authority of the Union whose leadership is comprised of its member 
states. In much the same way, the Westphalian system provided this sort of arrangement for the 
sovereign principalities of Germany while keeping some form of cohesiveness amongst the Holy 
Roman Empire.62
Scholars would agree that the Peace of Westphalia was, for its time, a revolutionary and 
monumental achievement; it developed the framework for international diplomacy, a construct 
which simply did not exist prior to the 17th century. This peace was extremely influential down 
through the Treaty of Versailles and the Westphalian tradition can still be seen in modem 
international politics. Compromises reached by the congress in 1648 on the issues of individual 
state sovereignty, religious tolerance, and diplomatic solutions to international warfare were the 
precedents of common and international law until the First World War and, arguably, still form 
the core of foreign policy. The Westphalian tradition can be seen in various modem international 
forums including the United Nations and is one of history’s leading examples of how one 
conflict can impact the affairs of dozens of independent nations for centuries.
58 Toynbee, Arnold. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967. 1 ed. 1, Fred L. Israel. New York: Chelsea 
House Publishers, 1967.
59 Nathan, James A. Soldiers, Statecraft, and histoiy: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. 1 ed. Westport 
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2003.
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By T.J. McCarrick ‘12
It is often said among historians that “we stand upon the shoulders of giants,” learning from and 
building on the wisdom won by the tiresome work of great men and women before us. But with 
that prominence comes a price, the price of being put on trial again and again before the ever 
changing tribunal of history. As John Lukacs writes, “Historical thinking and writing and study 
are, by their nature, revisionist. The historian, unlike a judge, is permitted to try a case over and 
over again, often after finding and employing new evidence” (Lukacs, 21). That Winston 
Churchill is such a historical giant well-tested in the hallowed halls of history is beyond dispute; 
what is not is what kind of giant Churchill was and whether his contributions to the course of 
world events were on par positive and negative. In analyzing two definitive works with differing 
perspectives on Churchill, Churchill: Visionary. Statesman. Historian, by John Lukacs and 
Churchill: The End o f Glory by John Charmley, the following question can be answered: Should 
Winston Churchill be hailed as the savior of Western civilization or should he be vilified as an 
alcoholic imperialist drunk? The answer, as it often does, lies somewhere in the middle.
The above notwithstanding, questions of Churchill’s character often lend themselves to 
answers of a polarizing quality. John Charmley’s analysis in The End o f Glory champions the 
type of negative character portrayals of Churchill that have become vogue as of late. Paying 
some small praise to Churchill’s positive characteristics, Charmley proceeds lambasting what he 
considers to be an overly romanticized myth about Churchill. He writes, “Showman that he was, 
stalking through the bomb-sites with taurine glares of defiance, massive cigar stuck firmly in his 
mouth, he became the mythical ‘Good ole Winnie’” (152). What this myth obscures, however, 
was a profoundly impulsive, ill-tempered, intellectually lazy man. And yet, despite these 
shortcomings, Churchill’s indefatigable ambition propelled him to his position of prominence. 
Charmley, quoting Churchill explains, “You know I have unbounded faith in myself’ (Charmley,
9).
Underpinning this faith, though, was an insufferable vanity which, coupled with his 
mental acumen proved lethal. Charmley explains that the “ebullient” and “seld-centered” 
Churchill, left unchecked, became intolerable in public office. He writes, “Churchill had little 
time or space for other people and their opinions ... One of the reasons why the Churchill 
marriage was a success.. .was that for most of it Clementine had the strength of character to stand 
up to her husband and prevent him becoming in the domestic sphere what he too easily became 
in the public sphere, a petty tyrant” (86). Much of this self-assuredness and sense of entitlement
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is often ascribed to his aristocratic upbringing. Lukacs, quoting The Daily News in 1908 
explains, “To the insatiable curiosity and the enthusiasm of a child he joins the frankness of the 
child. He has no reserves and no shams. He has that scorn of concealment that belongs to a caste 
which never doubts itself’ (Lukacs, 143). And because of this air of superiority, Churchill was 
never effective in applying his intelligence to others arguments. Charmley explains, “Churchill’s 
self-education.. .provided no training in learning how to think, how to weigh arguments, and how 
to judge your own ideas against those of others...he was marked by egotism and naivete” (152). 
This boyish arrogance and temperament coupled with Churchill’s high office placed him, on 
more than one occasion, in the position to affect change, not always for the better.
It is crucial, therefore, to isolate some of Churchill’s official failures as distinct from but 
connected to his personal flaws. The first grouping concerns his hearty endorsement of a number 
of failed military strategies. The most well known is his fierce advocacy, during World War I, of 
a naval operation through the Dardanelles as a part of a grandiose scheme to near instantly knock 
Turkey out of the war. In short, it was a disaster, as predicted by a number of military men. 
Lukacs explains, “Battleships and other warships were sunk; the rest of the fleets had to turn 
around; their naval artillery could not (and should not have been expected to) destroy the guns of 
the fortifications on land; the subsequent decision to land troops and conquer the Gallipoli 
peninsula over land turned into another sad disaster” (143). In this vein, Churchill was hopelessly 
wrong in terms of his tactical vision. This is to say nothing of his strategic vision which left 
much to be desired as well -  given the state of mobility and technological capacity of German 
forces, it is difficult to suggest the Balkans as the linchpin of penetrating German territory. This 
provides just one in a series of tactical military blunders advocated by Churchill including his 
support of the White Russians during the Bolshevik Revolution as well as the failed Norwegian 
campaign in WWII.
Additionally, Charmley argues that Germanophobia ultimately caused Churchill to 
consummate an illegitimate marriage with Stalin’s Russia -  a marriage which would bear bitter 
fruit. Regarding Churchill’s fear of the Germans, Charmley asserts that Churchill was really 
nothing more than a warmonger preparing for Armageddon. As a result, any chance of making 
peace with Germany was not entertained. Charmley writes:
The ‘finest hour’ myth has such a hold on the British national consciousness that 
even to suggest, fifty years later, that a compromise peace might have been had is 
enough to prompt letters to the press denouncing such an idea as ‘shameful’ and 
the product o f  ‘dubious hindsight’... The best accounts of the Second World War 
written to mark the fiftieth anniversary of 1939 declared grandly that after the fall 
of France, German peace feelers were brushed aside with scant evidence of 
interest in them...there was a continued interest in ‘peace.’ (Charmley, 422-423)
This interest, according to Charmley was not only among many British officials (though he 
contends evidence of that is conveniently in absentia), but also among the British populace. 
Churchill, however, at every juncture, from Munich to Operation Barbarossa, ignored the 
possibility of peace with Germany creating, “the spectre of a menace which was even greater 
than the one he destroyed” (Lukacs, quoting Charmley, 151).
That menace which was borne of Churchill’s antipathy towards Germany was Stalin’s red 
menace in the East. In order to counteract growing German power in continental Europe, 
Churchill envisioned an Anglo-Russian alliance as a buffer to German dominance of Europe. 
Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union allowed this vision to become a reality. “Churchill had long
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trumpeted the necessity for a Russian alliance, but lulled by the siren voice of Ivan Maisky and 
the grandeur of his own vision, he had never stopped to ask what might be the price which Stalin 
would demand” (Charmley, 361). This quotation demonstrates a point central to, what Charmley 
believes, is one of Churchill’s most egregious shortcomings -  the auctioning of Eastern Europe 
to Russia. Lukacs explains the position of those historians who join Charmley’s company in this 
view. He writes, “They accuse Churchill of double standards. He, who fought bitterly and single- 
mindedly against the appeasement of Germany and of Hitler, went a very long way to appease 
Stalin and Russia.. .His hatred of Germany blinded him throughout the war. It also made him an 
accomplice in allowing Russia and Communism to advance far into the heart of Europe” (Lukacs 
21-22). In this way, some suggest that Churchill foolishly dismissed any chance of peace with 
the devil he knew (Hitler) and in so doing condemned Eastern Europe to the devil he didn’t 
(Stalin).
The inability of Churchill to halt the Soviet advance into the heart of Europe lies very 
closely near the final shortcoming to be analyzed -  his subservience to the United States. Perhaps 
begrudgingly, Churchill realized that the 20th century was not to be hailed as a British one. Any 
chance of such a vision would likely have been shattered with the houses of London during 
Germany’s blitzkrieg. By this point the eventual liquidation of the British Empire Churchill 
sought to maintain was inevitable, and playing second-fiddle to the Americans was the only way 
Britain could achieve some sort of peace and independence with honor. But what really was 
won? Lukacs quoting Charmley explains, “One simple fact: the Prime Minister’s policy in 1940 
had, in effect, failed. Far from securing Britain’s independence, it had mortgaged it to America” 
(150). And so Churchill’s Germanophobia, far from securing Britain and Europe from the Nazi 
war machine, traded their respective futures to the Americans and the Soviets.
But is Charmley’s portrait of Churchill a true one, a fair one? Simply put, no, it is not. 
Leaving aside the factual inaccuracies, fatally flawed historical lessons, and widespread 
popularity among Nazi supporters (which will be discussed later), there are two other issues 
looming large for Charmley. The first is his obvious bias. John Lukacs describes the important 
influence of Piers Mackesy, the son of Major General Macksey, on Charmley. Such a relation 
would be unremarkable excepting the fact that there were personal disagreements between the 
Major General and Churchill. Mentioned only in passing by Churchill in his War Memoirs, 
Charmley devotes “five pages and ten references to Churchill’s quarrel with that incompetent 
general, while there is but one single sentence about the Hitler-Stalin Pact...a very peculiar ratio 
for a historian” (153).
An additional problem is the manner in which he employs sources. Not even attempting 
any measure of impartiality, Charmley openly attacks, often in his notes, those historians with 
whose views he disagrees and simultaneously lavishes praise on those with whom he is in 
accord. One disturbing example is Lukacs’ illustration of Charmley’s reliance on David Irving, 
whose work has some notable anti-Semitic leanings. To wit, some of the following are examples 
of Charmley’s reliance on Irving: “Winston was certainly bankrolled by wealthy Jews” and “So 
was Churchill the hired help for a Jewish lobby which, regarding Jewish interests as superior to 
those of the British Empire, was determined to embroil that empire in a war on its behalf.” (153). 
(I would really hate to give in to the urge to draw parallels between Irving’s words and the words 
of a genocidal dictator in the Rhineland in 1940, but if the boot fits...) Charmley’s reliance on 
such works bespeaks a sad truth, the truth that he sought to find evidence for a previously held 
position and in so doing undertook not a “proper revisionism of a historian” but a “denigration 
by a pamphleteer” (152).
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Did Churchill have his faults and personal shortcomings? Certainly; all people do. But 
Lukacs contends, and I tend to agree, that Churchill’s virtues far outweighed his vices. A woman 
who Churchill fancied when he was younger put it best: “The first time you meet Winston you 
see all his faults, and the rest of your life you spend in discovering his virtues” (144). And those 
virtues were magnified one thousand fold as his political career blossomed. His wit, intelligence, 
foresight, and courage were put on full display, as were his faults. Lukacs explains, “Churchill’s 
foresights were historical rather than political. Impetuosity, impatience, willfulness, fancifulness 
were Churchill’s faults, often. Shortsightedness? No. An unwillingness to think? Seldom: 
perhaps never” (4). Such qualities contributed to Churchill’s open-mindedness, an invaluable 
quality. Churchill himself once wrote, “An unchanging mind is an admirable possession -  a 
possession which I devoutly hope I shall never possess” (138-139). But his ability to take 
seemingly contradictory policies should not be mistaken for indecision. Rather, his advocacies 
and policy positions were based in principle, allowing for flexible application. As such he 
simultaneously could warn of the dangers of Tory democracy and defend it, vigorously oppose 
Hitler while tolerating Stalin, and do about-faces on a number of positions concerning Ireland 
and India. It is through this lens that one must view his successes and failures.
One should not confuse my endorsement of a net positive view of Churchill to mean he 
had no practical failings. The Dardanelles debacle, the Norwegian nightmare, his imperialist 
leanings (especially towards withholding dominion status from India), and his failure to support 
German resistance movements are tragic. But it is important to remember that there is more than 
myth in Churchill’s “finest hour.” Earlier than all others, Churchill envisioned a vengeful 
Germany dominated by the increasingly radical, though, at that time, little known Adolf Hitler.
As Hitler rose to power, Churchill’s predictions came true. Lukacs writes, “He saw that Hitler 
had forged a formidable unity of a people; that German National Socialism was a terrific wave of 
a possible future; and it was against this that his Britain had to stand fast” (9). And stand fast it 
did, much to the chagrin of Charmley and Co. To negotiate with Hitler was fundamentally 
impossible as it would condemn Europe, and perhaps, Britain to complete and total German 
dominance. Again, Lukacs writes, “What is not speculation is what Churchill... called ‘the 
slippery slope.’ If... a British government had signaled as much as a cautious inclination to 
explore a negotiation with Hitler, amounting to a willingness to ascertain his possible terms, that 
would have been the first step onto a Slippery Slope from which there could be no retreat” (2). 
Churchill’s unyielding courage in dismissing appeasement with Adolf Hitler made clear that 
though Britain could not defeat Germany by themselves (which later they were not), so long as 
Churchill’s Britain pressed on, Hitler could not achieve his ultimate goal.
Enter the Churchill- Stalin relationship, borne of necessity -  the necessity to stop Hitler at 
all costs. Lukacs explains, “As early as 1940 he saw two alternatives: either Germany dominates 
all of Europe; or Russia will dominate the eastern portion of Europe (at worst for a while): and 
half of Europe is better than none” (10). To be clear, Churchill abhorred Communism; his 
willingness to support the White Russians in their opposition to the Bolsheviks is instructive.
But what Churchill was able to do was what many of his contemporary American allies could not 
-  distinguish Stalin and his nationalist ambitions from the international rhetoric of the 
communist movement. Lukacs writes, “Churchill’s recognition that Stalin was a nationalist and 
not an internationalist Communist; and that the clue to the Russian ‘enigma’ lay in the interests 
of the Russian imperial state as seen by Stalin” (12). Though he initially misestimated Russian 
support for some of its allies a la Czechoslovakia under threat of German invasion, he had a
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clear grasp of the bigger picture. That said, he did not underestimate the Soviet threat. After all, 
this is the very same Winston Churchill who warned of the iron curtain descending over Europe.
In this way, Churchill understood the Russian threat in the East -  so much so that he 
lobbied the American forces to cut off the Russians westward advance as early as possible. If 
there is any great failing of Churchill’s career it is this. But it is silly to misappropriate the blame 
for the fall of Eastern Europe to Churchill and not place it rightly on the shoulders of Eisenhower 
and America. There was little leverage that Churchill could bring to bear on this question, not to 
mention the central importance of the Anglo-American relationship for the future. That said, he 
pushed the Americans on this question, and after the war was over on questions of the Soviet 
Union -  hardly the actions of an American pawn. Lastly, it was Churchill who predicted that 
Russia could not subjugate Eastern Europe forever; their peoples would not tolerate it. 
Approximately a half-century later, his prediction proved right.
The above provide but two examples of Churchill’s visionary quality, a talent greatly 
emphasized by Lukacs. I believe that this talent was greatly aided by another, perhaps 
underemphasized facet of Churchill’s life -  his role as a historian. After all, Winston Churchill is 
one of a very few people who made history, but also wrote it. And this, I believe, was the secret 
to his success. His mastery of events before him gave him the foresight and visionary ability to 
see and thus shape those things lying before him. Lukacs explains, “history was not, for 
Churchill, like painting, something one turned to for relaxation or merely to turn an honest 
guinea to meet his mountainous expenses. History was the heart of his faith; it permeated 
everything which he touched, and it was the mainspring of his politics and the secret of his 
immense mastery” (124). And by making history the core of his person, the core of his politics, 
Churchill became the consummate statesman-historian, unsurpassed in his visionary ability. He 
saw himself standing at a key crossroads of history, perhaps one the defining moments of the 
modem era. And he chose to defend civilization. Take his poignant words towards the close of 
his career. He said, “Which way shall we turn to save our lives and the future of the world? It 
does not matter so much for old people; they are going soon away; but I find it poignant to look 
at youth in all its activity and ardour.. .and wonder what would lie before them if  God wearied of 
mankind?” (18). I imagine that the landscape of the world would look something like Europe at 
Hitler’s peak. We should consider ourselves lucky that Winston Churchill never wearied of 
defending mankind.
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Introduction
Theodore Gericault was a French Romantic artist in the early nineteenth century. During 
that time period, the political climate was fluctuating between the empire of Napoleon and the 
monarchy. French society was constantly changing whenever there was a shift in power. The 
subsequent revolutions affected the culture tremendously.
Gericault used the current events around him to create works indicative to his times. 
When Napoleon was in power, his paintings reflected the Bonapartists’ view of the emperor’s 
army. After the monarchy was restored, the painter produced a work that voiced the uncertainty 
many felt concerning the new government.
Eventually, his greatest piece, The Raft o f the Medusa, would be the artwork that 
encompassed many aspects of nineteenth century French Society. Based on a shipwreck caused
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by insensible royalist leaders, the painting stirred the public. Royalists were offended by this 
supposed attack, while Bonapartists were delighted in believing that Gericault was glorifying 
their struggle against the monarchy. One feature of the painting in particular, the “Father” figure, 
embodied these conflicting emotions and sensations of many Parisians.
In addition to this, the character of the “Father” was an allusion to Ugolino, an icon of 
cannibalism. The “Father” also hinted at madness. Gericault was fascinated by darker subjects. 
His interest is analogous to the rising interest in the gruesome and morbid in France. The Raft o f 
the Medusa not only presented French society with its own struggles, but the painting also 
introduced society to the uprising Romantic Movement.
The Early Works of Gericault
The Salon was the appellation of the esteemed art exhibitions in Paris, France that Louis 
XIV started in 1667. 1 Since 1737, the Salon was an annual event in which many artists 
participated. When Napoleon Bonaparte was First Consul in 1799, he became a great patron to 
the arts and used the popular style of Neoclassicism to help enhance his political image. The 
Salon changed noticeably after Bonaparte was crowned Emperor in 1804. 2 Artists were now 
painting images glorifying the emperor, and they continued to do so until Napoleon had to 
renounce his throne in 1814. France would be a monarchy again.
However, despite the extreme political changes that were already underway, it was 
announced that the Salon would still continue to display the arts during the summer of 1814. 
Many people, particularly artists, wondered why the king would allow the Salon to continue that 
year, since Napoleon had been using the Salon for his preferred subject matter. The recently 
restored king may have wanted the Salon held in order to show the public that the new 
government was steady. This exhibition would be the first time in over two decades that artists 
had to conform to royal standards.3 Artists had the predicament of switching from the subject of 
Napoleon to Louis XVII in less than a year, giving artists little time to create new works under a 
regime where the artistic guidelines had not been drawn. Artists were allowed to submit past 
works for that year, perhaps to help alleviate the problem of finding a new subject for their 
paintings. 4
It was in the 1814 Salon that the artist of focus, Jean-Louis-Andre-Theodore Gericault, 
presented both his past Salon submission Charging Chasseur (Figure A), and his new work, 
Wounded Cuirassier Leaving the Field o f Battle (Figure B). Unlike other painters of that day 
who entered pieces that strayed away from political subjects, Gericault submitted these two 
together, and uncomfortably reminded the viewers of the rise and fall of the emperor.
The Charging Chasseur was originally submitted to the Salon in 1812. It is a massive 
2,920 millimeters high by 1,940 millimeters wide, and depicted an officer of the Imperial Guard. 
Its subject matter fits with the norm during the time of Napoleon’s rule, since the piece depicted 
a sentry in the act of running into battle. The sentry sits atop the horse on a leopard skin with his 
sword out. This act of rushing into battle corresponds to how Napoleon was during his Wars, and 
thus was accepted favorably during the Salon of 1812.
1 Adams, Laurie Schneider. A History of Western Art Revised. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008, 398.
2 Ibid, 382.
3 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work. London: Orbis Publishing, 1983, 60.
4 Ibid, 61
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As large as it it, it was impressive how long it took for Gericault to complete it. Eitner 
states that the painter probably had at most three weeks to start the actual artwork.5 The brief 
amount of time to create such a large piece led Gericault to have some compositional errors. The 
foreshortening of the horse’s leg was rushed and is slightly off. It is almost out of proportion 
with the rest of the animal’s body. His brushstrokes vary throughout the painting, as well.6 
Certain areas on the horse’s face were painted with bold, large strokes; other parts of the body 
are painted with smaller patches of color. Besides the horse, the colors throughout the painting 
are vibrant, and the hue of the smoke gives the work an intense atmosphere. Overall though, the 
painting has bravado, a massive figure charging into battle along with his animated steed.
For the Wounded Cuirassier to be shown along with the fighting Imperial guard was a 
bold action for Gericault. The meaning of the two in juxtaposition would not have been lost to 
the audience. Cuirassiers were heavily armored cavalry soldiers that Napoleon used frequently. 7 
The soldier in this painting appears defeated, looking back at the battle as if it had been lost. In 
addition to this, he is holding his agitated horse back. Instead of bold colors, the Cuirassier has
more muted tones and the soldier is larger. Perhaps he is depicted larger to focus on the defeat in 
his countenance. Gericault’s brushstrokes are less bold.8 The defeated soldier would have been a 
representation of Napoleon’s defeat and the consequences of the Restoration. How mighty 
Bonaparte and his army had been, only for many to be defeated.
This hint at the recent war most likely affected the Salon critics’ opinions toward 
Gericault’s latest work. Once again, Gericault had about three weeks to complete a larger than 
normal painting, this time 2,929 millimeters high by 2,270 millimeters wide.9 His composition 
was similarly rushed as his last submission, however, this time some critics were more prone to 
disapprove while the others were content with ignoring the painting. Some weaknesses the 
evaluators found were that, “Not only does the horse’s head appear to be joined directly to its 
rump, but there is a conflict in its very motion...The animal’s spine, besides being too short, 
seems broken in the middle.”10 Unlike the Salon of 1812, the royalist reviewers did not overlook 
the faults of the painting, since they were trying to publicly disapprove of the empiric reminder. 
Regardless of these prejudices, Gericault had presented the otherwise dull Salon with an original
5 Ibid, 33.
6 Ibid, 34.
7 Mast, Rein van der. “Regimental History,” http://www.tentpegging.nl/kurassiers/
8 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault. Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1971, 52.
9 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault, 71.
10 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 64.
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painting. It struck a chord with the public and presented them with reality. Napoleon was gone, 
and France was vulnerable.
History of The Raft of the Medusa
Gericault painted exactly what was happening in society and, having the bravado youth 
brings, did not hold much back. The painter’s next submission to the Salon would be grandiose. 
His masterpiece, The Raft o f the Medusa (Figure C), was presented during the Salon of 1819.11 
This dramatic work illustrated the scandalous shipwreck that occurred in 1816. The artist wanted
a scene painted that would be as truthful as it could be. He wished to make the reality of it 
apparent, so the painting has impressive dimensions of 4,910 millimeters high by 7,160 
millimeters wide.1 As the wrecked and dilapidated raft rides the precarious waves, the few 
survivors are signaling to a distant, almost invisible, ship. There are corpses on the raft, and a 
distraught castaway holding a body. The colors that compose the painting are mostly muted 
greens, blues, and browns. Eitner states that Gericault used these somber colors to better 
complement and focus on the severity of the scene.1 23 These colors give the painting a glow, as if 
there was a special lighting that emphasized the figures. Such a large piece of work makes the 
viewer feel as if they are part of the raft itself, trying to see the ship toward which the others are 
waving.
Many French onlookers would have known the context behind the painting that 
spectators of the present day may not. Gericault was obviously acquainted with the story, and 
sympathetic to the victims of the real raft for which the painting was based. For the purposes of 
further in-depth discussion, the history behind the event will be explained.
While on its way to Senegal, La Meduse crashed against rocks on the West African coast, 
even though the sea was tranquil. Hughes Duroy de Chaumareys, the captain, was incompetent 
and failed to safely guide the ship in clear waters. It is almost inconceivable that someone 
unqualified for the duties of a captain could have received such a title. However, de Chaumareys 
had received his title, not through merit as a sailor, but through official favor. As La Meduse had 
to be abandoned by the four hundred aboard, de Chaumareys, along with the other officers, went 
on one of the six lifeboats that could only hold about two hundred and fifty. The other unlucky 
passengers had to cram onto a makeshift raft.14 On this raft, many were killed from both nature 
causes and extremely unnatural causes. They were found by another ship, the Argus, which 
rescued the final fifteen.15
11 Ibid, 185.
12 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault's Raft o f the Medusa, 151.
14 Ibid, 158-159.
13 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 189.
Ibid, 162.15
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Two survivors of the abandonment, Alexandre Correard and Henri Savigny wrote 
Naufrage de la Fregate la Meduse in 1817 that described the horrors of raft.16 During the first 
night course at sea, the winds were so strong that many could not stay on the raft. The next day, 
many men were drinking heavily and became enraged at the situation. There was a mutiny 
between those who were attempting to tear the raft apart and those attempting to save it. Many 
died, but the raft was not destroyed that night. However, darker events were to occur. Since they 
were abandoned and left with little food, the starved individuals eventually resorted to 
cannibalism on the fourth day. As the days stretched on, many men became insane; others 
became sick, and then killed in order to save rations. By the end of thirteen days, only fifteen 
men were left.17 It is provocative to note that all the survivors were former Napoleonic soldiers.18
Gericault read the Naufrage and met with Correard and Savigny when he arrived back in 
France after a trip to Italy. He was sympathetic to their experiences; causing him to eventually 
decide to make his next work about the shipwreck. Eitner states that Gericault found it difficult 
to pinpoint exactly the image the artist wanted to portray. The painter:
...struggled to translate the words of Correard and Savigny into images, grasping 
at anything that might help him give substance to their tale -  popular lithographs 
of the shipwreck, the talk of survivors, a scale model of the Raft, built for him by 
the Medusa's carpenter.19
After receiving all of this information, he started his preliminary sketches for the painting. He 
had many ideas and images in mind; Gericault was attempting to find a scene on which to focus.
Finding the Subject
Even though Gericault was sympathetic to the situation of the survivors, it would not be 
particularly correct to say that the artist was making a radical statement with his painting. Eitner 
states, as well as a few other scholars, that Gericault was not particularly political. He was 
sympathetic to causes, but he was not trying to anger the government at all.20 His interest in 
modem subject matter led him to paint events or people that were relevant. During his first Salon 
exhibition, his subject, a charging soldier, was appropriate to the ongoing Napoleonic Wars. His 
Cuirassier piece depicted a general feeling of confusion and uneasiness the people may have had 
after the fall of the emperor. The Raft depicted an event that stirred debate within the French 
viewers about the government. While the French in the Bourbon Restoration could have taken 
certain sentiments from Gericault’s painting, present day society can learn much from his 
masterpiece about French nineteenth century society. Although Gericault may not have intended 
it, The Raft o f the Medusa represents certain aspects of French Romanticism, particularly its 
interest in morbidity, which can be seen in the themes surrounding the artist’s "Father" figure in 
the painting.
In order to further discuss the figure, it would be valuable to elaborate on the themes of 
Romanticism. As it is further explained, it will become clear that the artist lived before the 
artistic movement was popular. In addition to the condensed history of the movement, it would 
also be helpful to talk of Gericault’s own influences.
16 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault's Raft of the Medusa, 22.
17 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 160-162.
18 Grigsby, Darcy Grimaldo. Extremities: Painting Empire in Post-Revolutionary France. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002, 175.
19 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault’s Raft o f the Medusa, 22.
20 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 49.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 1 111
The beginning of the Romantic Movement is difficult to pinpoint, as its influence came in 
at different times in various countries. A forerunner of Romantic ideas was the French 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who lived from 1712 to 1778. His Social Contract inspired 
the French Revolution, which stressed the idea of people ruling over themselves, as opposed to 
being ruled by a government.21 Rousseau’s other work, Les reveries du promeneur solitaire, 
focused on nature and how it influenced humankind. While his more political work inspired the 
French Revolution, his “return to nature” view was for the most part ignored at first. Romantic 
historian Lillian Furst states that once the Reign of Terror took over there was little imaginative 
writing.22 It seems reasonable to follow that art would have been limited to that of the Revolution 
and, later, Napoleon. French Romanticism became popularized much later than the German or 
British Romanticism. Romantic ideas include: nature influencing man’s character, 
acknowledging nature’s beauty, nostalgia for the past, a religious influence, adventure, and 
individual freedom and creativity.23
Another important aspect of Romanticism was “the cult of the sublime.” Edmund Burke 
published A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f our Ideas o f the Sublime and Beautiful in 
1757. Burke’s book reflected on the aesthetics of art, and how there was an “irrational” 
fascination with pain and death, along with beauty and life. The themes of the hideous and 
beautiful are elements of the “sublime.” 24 *It is this idea of morbidity that became popular with 
Romantics and has its beginnings during the Bourbon Restoration. Indeed, historian Alice 
Killen states that real and paranormal horrors, such as murder, suicides, ghosts, and demons, 
became popular in literature due to the changing psychological climate in France after the 
Revolution.26 *An example of the entertainment value of horror can be seen in the fantasmagorie 
shows that Parisians would view. These magic-lantern shows were intended to scare the audience
2 7with lights, sounds, and moving figures portraying apparitions and cadavers.
Gericault admired poets such as Byron, Miller, and Tasso.28 Near the end of his life, he 
was in need of money and decided to illustrate poems and works by Romantic poets and writers 
for publishers. However, besides his 1822-1823 oil sketches from Byronic works, such as 
Mazeppa (Figure D), the artist was not inspired to paint from literature.29 The fact that Gericault 
did not want to choose topics from literature identified him as an original thinker. While there 
are hints in the Raft to Dante, most of his works show that he was much more interested in 
modem events that were happening. Unlike the work of his contemporaries, because he painted 
from real-life, his works contain the realism that many other paintings lacked.30 Instead of 
working from literature, he was able to paint from examples all around him. Since the world
21 Adams, Laurie Schneider. A History of Western Art Revised, 367.
22 Furst, Lilian R. “Romanticism in Historical Perspective.” Comparative Literature Studies 5, No. 2 (1968). 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40467744, 119, 125.
23 Adams, Laurie Schneider. A History of Western Art Revised, 394-395.
24 Ibid, 405.
25 Brejon de Lavergnee, Amaud, Marie-CIaude Chaudonneret and others. French Painting 1774-1830: The Age of
Revolution. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975,236.
Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina. “Gericault's Severed Heads and Limbs: The Politics and Aesthetics of the
Scaffold.” The Art Bulletin 74, No. 4 (1992). http://www.jstor.org/stable/3045912, 610
27 Ibid, 611.
28 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 259.
29 Ibid, 259-260.
30 Ibid, 259.
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around him constantly shifted and changed toward a seemingly daunting future, the artist would 
be influenced by the pessimistic atmosphere.
Gericault was definitely interested in macabre subjects, if not completely charmed by 
them. During the years of 1815-1816, the artist was distressed and guilty about his furtive, 
passionate love affair with Alexandrine-Modeste Caruel, his young aunt that was married to 
Gericault’s uncle, Jean-Baptiste Caruel.31
Caruel had done much for Gericault. While the artist had a father, Georges-Nicolas 
Gericault, the two were not close. Georges-Nicolas did not wish for his son to be a painter. So 
after Gericault left home at seventeen, he stayed with his uncle. Caruel allowed Georges-Nicolas 
to believe that Gericault was working at the uncle’s firm.32 After doing so much for his nephew, 
in return the artist was in love with Camel’s wife. This pain was too much to bear.
It was most likely because of his need to escape that Gericault decided to leave for Italy. 
There, he studied mostly Michelangelo, which caused his style evolved. According to Eitner, he 
began using more chiaroscuro, defined as the interplay of shadow and light. The artist was also 
interested in the sculptural quality in human forms.33 Even though his trip was enlightening, he 
was still troubled and sad. There are letters that Gericault wrote to his friend Dedreux-Dorcy 
where the artist frequently expressed his disheartened moods.34 What exactly created these 
moods id not known, but it could be attributed to the guilty affair that he left in France, or 
perhaps the doubt he felt about his own talent after seeing the masters in Italy.
During 1815, something else may have affected Gericault’s disposition, as well. In his 
home country, the Second White Terror began. After the Hundred Days, King Louis XVIII was 
restored on the throne. In Marseilles, there was an extensive termination of anyone attached to or 
loyal to Napoleon. A famous example of this system of elimination is seen in the case of 
Marechal Ney, a Bonapartist, was judged and then secretly shot. The White Terror consequently 
put the Bourbons in a bad light for many French citizens and must have affected the out-of- 
country artist when a few of his relatives were murdered.35 His stance on politics began to lean 
toward the old empire, as a result.
When Gericault returned from Italy in 1817, there was a period of great personal crises. 
After being away from his lover for so long, Alexandrine and he continued their affair until she 
became pregnant with his child. Within months his uncle would be aware of the betrayal and 
Gericault would have to endure the consequences. In order to deal with this, he became more 
interested in painting than normal, paid further attention to the news, and was more willing to 
become influenced by his friends. Being involved in other peoples’ lives was better than being 
entangled in his own. Gericault lived in “La Nouvelle Athenes” where his neighbors were 
creative individuals, such as actors and writers. They lived on one side and on the other side 
resided Napoleonic veterans, including Colonel Louis Bro. He spent much time in the studio of a 
popular French artist at the time, and next-door neighbor, Horace Vemet. Being friends, Vemet 
influenced Gericault with his outspokenness against the Bourbons and his interest in modem 
subjects. 36 As he tried to paint something that would make him renowned, Eitner states that 
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He understood that in his too-exclusive concern with formal expression he had 
neglected an important resource...The true alternative to the falsity and boredom of 
official history painting was not the elimination or the neutralization of subject- 
matter, but the use of more vital subjects, taken directly from contemporary life and 
capable of touching the viewer’s nerve.37
He felt that his talent could be used and applied to modem subjects and things that would have 
struck his audience emotionally. Current events would be his inspiration. These new subjects 
would be taken and, using what he learned from the old masters in Italy, painted in such a grand 
and personal way that they would impress those who saw them.
The Power of Emotion
As he continued to work in Vernet's studio, Gericault began to teach himself how to 
create lithographs. Impressive considering that he was new to the medium, most of his print 
work dealt with the Napoleonic veterans who were now poor and desolate, living on half-pay.38 
Once again, he was influenced by the people and subjects around him that were motivating. To 
reiterate, though, the artist was still not political, he was simply being sympathetic to the 
unfortunate. While his friends were Bonapartists, he was more liberal. Gericault’s works never 
truly set out to voice an opinion against or for the royal government. The topics he chose to 
depict created emotions within himself that he may have felt would have the same effect on the 
audience.
While the artist now had the idea of choosing contemporary subjects, he was not sure of 
what his next project would be. Even though he had heard of the Medusa, there were other 
subjects that interested him. This other subject provides a glimpse into Gericault’s personal 
interests, and how it eventually led him to choose the shipwreck.
In 1818, at the same time he was starting sketches for the Raft, he was also contemplating 
whether to work on the scandalous murder of a former official, Fauldes, in the South of France. 
The magistrate had been dragged out of his house, murdered, and then dumped in a river by 
thieves. Gericault had been hoping to create a “heroic” piece from the newspaper accounts. 
However, Eitner tells of how someone had shown Gericault a print of the murder that was 
superior to his own lithographs and he decided not to go through with a whole painting devoted 
to Fauldes.39 It would have also been difficult to create emotion from the French audience, as the 
event dealt with petty robbers and a gruesome murder. While this sensational murder was 
appropriate for newspapers, it perhaps would not have gotten praise from art critics.
Gericault’s lithographs give an example of his new realism. There was more humanity in 
his works, instead of making the figures bland and stoic. Like the Wounded Cuirassier, his 
lithographs depicted Fauldes and the veterans with pity. Emotion, and the power it held, was to 
aid the artist’s focus.
When he felt intensely for the subject, it helped center his vision. An example of this is 
when he and Colonel Bro found his friend General Letellier in bed after committing suicide. 
General Letellier had just lost his beloved wife and died wearing her scarf over his head. 
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of exaggeration.40 Death was powerful in itself, and to add anything extra to the scene would 
have taken away from the beauty of deceased.
This incident serves as another example of Gericault’s Romantic qualities. He was moved 
by this morbid subject. The idea of suicide was probably on his mind at the time, as well. During 
the time he had found the deceased General, his love affair was about to be revealed. In the 
summer of 1818 Alexandrine-Modeste was a month away from having their child, and the affair 
would be exposed.41 To avoid the shame and scandal must have been desirable. Even though this 
personal connection prompted his necessity to draw this sketch, the idea of suicide was, in fact, 
popular in Paris at the time.
Before and after Gericault’s lifetime, suicide accounted for two-thirds of deaths in 
Paris.42 Most were poor Parisians who were stuck in their undesirable social situation. When a 
person did not have enough money to live properly, he or she just did not wish to live at all.43 
The sketch of the general, while it is specifically about one man’s hopelessness, was also a 
representation of other Parisians’ dejection.
With Letellier’s death fresh in his mind, Gericault had already decided to further his 
project of the Raft. While he had decided that the Meduse would be the subject, he now had to 
choose a specific point on the raft to depict. As stated above, Gericault had contacted the raft’s 
carpenter and had a scale model built. In addition to that, he also started to collect documents 
about the raft in order to get more data to stimulate his vision.44 From early sketches and designs,
40 Ibid, 157.
41 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault, 22.
42
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44 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 165.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 1 115
he was interested in about five incidences according to the survivors: the mutiny, the cannibalism 
that took place, the rescue of the raft, the sighting of the Argus, and the hailing of the Argus. The 
order in which the artist drew his scenes was fairly straightforward. The surviving first drafts are 
on simple figures, and then he would develop on the character or objects further. Through this 
process, historians were able to tell that the painter first was mostly interested in the scenes of the 
mutiny, rescue, and cannibalism the most in the beginning, and later decided he would focus on 
the sighting and hailing of the raft. These preliminary drawings show how Gericault was 
fascinated with the more gory details from the accounts of Correard and Savigny. While the 
rescue of the shipwrecked sailors was a topic that the artist did not depict often, he concentrated 
at first on the mutiny and the cannibalism that took place.45 *
He had quite a few sketches and pen illustrations on the mutiny. Here, the scenes were 
intense. In one pen sketch, there are figures twisting around each other in a struggle to the death 
(Figure F). Some are desperately holding onto the raft to avoid drowning in the harsh sea. There 
is a figure of a man holding onto a woman and a small child, presumably his wife and son. In a 
black chalk, wash, and gouache picture, it is a similar scene except the figures are larger and less
highlight the conflict (Figure G). 6 A change was made
Figure I
J
to the man holding his family, though. Now the man is only holding one person, saving him 
either by rescuing him out of the sea or from going into the sea.
Even though there is only one saved drawing that depicts anthropophagy, it is a finished 
work of black chalk, wash, and gouache. As it has been stated above, the more developed the 
work, the greater the probability that Gericault had been progressing to that point. Once again, 
Gericault depicts a topic that may not have sat well with the audience, as cannibalism is rarely 45*
45 Ibid, 343.
Berger, Klaus. Gericault and his Work. Translated by Winslow Ames. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
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depicted in Western art.47 From the Cannibalism on the Raft piece, it can again be seen that the 
sensationalism of the event interested the artist greatly (Figure H).
Through all the preliminary sketches of the mutiny and cannibalism, the same theme of 
an older man, the “Father” figure mentioned, kept constant. Another aspect that was constant in 
the beginning was the arrangement of the figures. The events, such as the mutiny, the rescue, and 
the cannibalism, were all displayed as if the raft were a stage.48 As he further experimented on 
the composition, Gericault had the idea of moving the raft closer to the foreground and having 
the figures leaning toward a focal point, in order for the viewer to feel as if they were another 
castaway on the raft. This was first used in the hailing of the Argus drawings. After these 
sketches, the painter felt he had found his subject.49 The hailing of the ship invokes anxiety, 
hope, and disappointment. Once he had decided on his subject, he began to carefully decide what 
figures and aspects would be in the final painting. There are many pages that Gericault sketched 
only certain characters and features that would eventually be integrated into the Raft. One of the 
main figures, and the focus of the essay, was the man holding the body of a younger man.
This theme of the “Father Mourning his Dead Son” was a basis for much of the painting, 
and was the foundation from which the viewer starts and follows through the piece. This figure, 
perhaps out of all the figures in the composition had, perhaps, the most personal connection to 
Gericault. As a man who had been separated from his lover, his son, and a betrayer of the uncle 
whom had raised him, the artist may have thought the father mourning his son was indicative of 
his situation. The thought of a man losing his son and the guilt and despair he felt may have been 
what the artist wished his uncle to feel. This idea comes from the fact that at the end of 1818, 
Gericault had just prepared a studio where he could concentrate on his project. At the same time, 
Alexandrine-Modeste had recently given birth to her nephew’s child. Gericault’s uncle had been 
incensed and sent her away while the child, Georges-Hyppolite was registered as an orphan.50 
The painting would be his way of escaping the scandal and guilt.
When he had finally decided to begin the final composition, Gericault shaved his hair in 
order to prevent the temptation of leaving. As a man so particular about his appearance, the 
cutting of his hair was intense.51 He stayed secluded in the studio and slept in a room attached to 
the building. A few friends would come to visit, and sometimes pose for him. Some famous 
painters who posed include Eugene Delacroix, Robert-Fleury, and Steuben. He even made sure 
two figures in the painting were likenesses of Correard and Savigny. The figures, it shall be seen, 
were given much thought and attention.
Interest in the Macabre
Gericault favored black chalk, crayons, pens, and pencils when he started the sketches. 
Quite a few drawings focused on the light and shadows the figures or objects would cast. While 
this exercise of sketching before embarking on a huge painting was normal, his other preparatory 
studies were more bizarre. To better understand the feeling and emotion the men on the raft must 
have felt, Gericault began to paint studies of limbs, severed heads, and terminally-ill patients 
from the Hospital Beaujon. Eitner believes he did this to keep himself emotionally charged while 
being isolated in his workspace (Figure I and Figure J). As he studied how the body decayed, he
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could possibly have felt as if he were there on the ship.52 This allowed the final product of the 
Raft to have a quality of authenticity in its figures. It is important to note that these are fully 
finished paintings of the limbs and heads, as opposed to just rough sketches, like the other scenes 
in the Raft. These morbid still-lifes were singular and kept his attention for a while during the 
Raft's preparation.
Gericault was able to get these body parts from the local hospitals and morgues. He kept 
the bodies until the stench was too much. When certain friends visited, they would be upset that 
they had to model near such corpses.53 While the artist’s behavior may seem very odd, remember 
that there was a great fascination with death and horror, in general, with Parisians, as stated 
above. In addition to viewing light shows meant to frighten, Parisians had been frequenting 
morgues since the late eighteenth century.
The beginning of public display of dead bodies started in the basse-gedle of prisons. 
Basse-gedle was a place where people were brought in to identify the bodies of their missing 
family members.54 Eventually, the basse-gedle was known as “the morgue”. In 1718, the word 
“morgue” was added to the dictionary of the Academie with its definition being, “a place at the 
Chatelet [prison] where dead bodies that have been found are open to the public view, in order 
that they be recognized.”55 Already, the viewing of the dead was a normal part of French culture. 
A morgue was not just a place where the dead were kept, but it was also a place for the dead to 
be publically observed.
While it was possible to see the bodies in the prison, the area where the bodies were kept 
was not ideal for recognizing people. The lighting was poor and individuals had to view corpses 
through bars. When the main prison in Paris, the Chatelet, was destroyed in 1804, the morgue 
moved to a building made specifically for the public presentation of bodies. The new building 
was reminiscent of a Greek temple in the Marche-Neuf, which was a popular location in the 
heart of Paris. As Schwartz writes, “Other European cities also had their morgues, but only in 
Paris were corpses displayed behind a large glass window through which the public might freely 
pass.”56 As this quote implies, there was something about French society that made morbidity 
almost conventional. The motive of moving the morgue to the Marche-Neuf was to help police 
identify bodies. However, Parisians found the morgue to be a free place to go where corpses 
were presented in a grand display.57 While death in itself is a natural part of life, the Parisian 
society transformed death into a form of entertainment.
Vanessa Schwartz states that there is a scholarly idea that the revolutionary crowd and the 
Parisian crowd were closely related, since Paris was wrought with numerous upheavals in 
government.58 Linked to both the revolutionary crowd and the Parisian crowd, Gericault 
represented both parts of French society. With family fortune keeping him financially stable, and 
having political friends such as Bro and Vemet, the painter was both a part of high society, as 
well as the revolutionary crowd. By this account, his works are even more indicative of French
52 Ibid, 183.
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society. Going back to the figure of the “Father,” his representation of death and cannibalism 
show how French culture was interested in terror and the “sublime”.
The “Father” and His Implications
In the Raft, the “Father” was depicted as an older man who looks away from the ship. He 
wore a red head cloth as he held a youth, the “Son”, in one hand, while resting his head on the 
other hand. Out of the nineteen figures, and out of the fourteen living figures, the “Father” was 
the only one completely unaffected by the faint ship. Even though one man was holding his hair 
out of frustration and another man was looking away in or to call attention to the Argus, it was 
the “Father” that does not react in any way to the possible salvation. Gericault placed this older 
man in the foreground of the painting. The “Father” is the first image to strike the observer. This 
figure could be understood in several ways during that time period.
The “Father” in Gericault’s has been linked to Dante Alighieri’s portrayal of Count 
Ugolino from the Inferno. Count Ugolino was a traitor to his nephew, Nino de’ Visconti, a leader 
of a political group in Pisa. He worked alongside the Archbishop Ruggieri. However, Ugolino 
was then betrayed by the Archbishop. The Pisans captured the Count and his four sons and shut 
them up in a tower. They were left to starve and Ugolino was infamous for eating his dead 
children. Cannibalism in the Inferno is “an allegory of men preying upon one another in an 
unjust society.” 59
In the Raft, the men on the ship are portrayed as wronged men who are trying to save 
themselves. However, in order for them to have lived for so long on the raft, they had to prey 
upon the other castaways and be the most ruthless and tough. They survived mutiny, literally 
preyed upon the bodies of the weak, and threw overboard those who were sick so as to preserve 
rations. The Inferno uses cannibalism as an allegory of men using each other, and so does 
Gericault. The “Father” that may represent Ugolino, points to the cannibalism and the unjust 
society that placed those men on the raft. The royal government allowed de Chaumareys to 
become a captain solely because of his birth. There was no need to test his merit in the flawed 
royalist government. If there was a competent captain behind the Meduse, the chances of so 
many people dying would have gone down exponentially.
The “Father” even wears a military medal on his chest, the Legion of Honor.60 The 
Legion of Honor was an order of merit for military and civilians who were examples of liberty 
and equality created by Napoleon. In order for him to have earned the medal, the “Father” either 
had spent 20 years doing peacetime service or was an excellent war hero.61 This old man has 
served under Napoleon and now must suffer under the unjust royalist government. As Boime 
suggests, the leaders of the Restoration purposefully intended to have the old supporters of the 
emperor murdered.62 Murdered or, as seen in the “Father”, mentally incapacitated. It could be 
implied that he was able to survive for so long because he had the Bonapartist mentality, or he 
was an upstanding citizen that was being punished by the prejudiced Restoration leaders. 
Considering the White Terror, this is not so remarkable.
While there was no actual depiction of a man eating another, unlike the Cannibalism 
piece, there are corpses strewn over the boards, and the “Son” that is held by the “Father”
59 Yates, Frances A., “Transformations o f Dante's Ugolino Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 14,
No. 1/2, 1951, http://www.jstor.org/stable/750354, 92.
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appears to have stumps at the end of his legs. While the older man holds the younger man who is 
missing limbs, it also recalls the cannibalistic Count. In Dante’s epic poem, Ugolino feels great 
remorse and horror at his own actions. The Father’s countenance is also reminiscent of this idea. 
He is one of two people in the Raft that does not look toward the Argus. However, he was alone 
in his grief for another.
Even though there is no factual proof that the painter was thinking about his personal 
issues when creating the “Father,” bearing in mind his tendency of using currents events as 
inspiration, he may have had his uncle in mind when creating the “Father”. As stated before, it 
was almost an unconscious idea through all the preparatory sketches to keep the theme of a 
father holding his children. At first it started with a man holding his whole family in the Mutiny, 
and then to just a man holding his son. Perhaps Gericault identified with the idea of going mad 
with guilt. However, this time he hoped his uncle, who had been supportive of his nephew’s 
artistry only to be betrayed, would still be mournful if Gericault died. Grief and sadness were 
large elements in their connection. There is a link between Ugolino and Gericault’s paternal 
relationships.
Indeed, the “Father” also calls attention to the madness that certain castaways felt before 
they committed suicide on the real raft. One would have to be slightly mad at any rate to resort to 
anthropophagy. In the painting, the older man’s face was mostly covered in shadow, his head 
supported by his hand. He looks away from the others toward the sea in a blank stare. The 
position the “Father” poses is the same pose as the melancholic madman. Also, the “Father” 
figure hides his hands slightly when covered by his hair. All these characteristics point toward 
the traditional iconography that implies insanity.63 What was the cause of his madness? His 
reason was lost when he could not face the injustice that happened to him and his “Son.” Like 
Ugolino, this “Father” will forever be punished by his guilt. French society was aware of Dante’s 
Ugolino and many who viewed Gericault’s painting may have seen the allusion to the Count. 
The critics may have noticed the hint at madness, as well. There was a trend involving the signs 
of madness.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there was an important book 
written by John Caspar Lavater that dealt with the physiognomy of humans.64 Lavater’s book 
was translated into French and was immensely popular, especially with its numerous 
illustrations. This novel allowed many artists to see the signs of insanity in a person, and used 
these signs in their works. As Gilman states, “It was the artists who themselves transmuted this 
tradition into new manners of seeing insanity as well as being influenced by it.” 65 While 
Gericault was using a combination of melancholy and madness on the figure, other artists in 
France were experimenting with physiognomy, likewise.
The way Gericault depicted the madman, or the “Father”, was more empathetic and 
portrait-like, as opposed to painting the madman using stereotypes. As stated above, he had 
sketched patients in the local hospitals. While this is unusual, he was not the only person to do 
this. There was a Swiss artist who made a sketchbook of patients of a Zurich asylum during 
Gericault’s time.66 So he was not alone in his thoughts of treating the mentally-ill as people, 
rather than all of them being raving lunatics. The “Father” had grown crazy due to the harsh
63 Gilman, Sander L. Ph.D., Seeing the Insane. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in assocaiation with
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conditions he was put through, not because he was evil or possessed. Similar to General Letellier 
and the poor, forgotten Napoleonic soldiers, life was severe.
Gilman writes, “The concept of a portrait of a single insane individual embodies the new 
status of the insane as citizens within the state, not outcasts from it.” This quote describes 
Gericault’s project of painting portraits of patients in an asylum for his friend, Georget. While 
this was one year after the exhibition of the Raft, the artist’s sympathies toward the oppressed 
were most likely unchanged from the year before. After being friends with forgotten soldiers and 
oppressed Bonapartists, for one to think he had compassion for the burdened and stereotyped 
mentally-ill is not implausible. He was one of the initiators of a new way of depicting asylum 
patients as humans in French art.
Salon Reviews
The fact that people were interested in the states of insanity again points to the increased 
attractiveness of the “sublime” and the beginning of fashionable Romanticism. As Delacroix 
looked upon the many sketches for the Raft, he was impressed at how “truly sublime” they were 
and how these pieces, “demonstrated the power of art to transfigure what was odious and 
monstrous in nature.”68 While certain subjects may have been dreadful, at the same time they 
were compelling.
This new way of enticing the viewer was so bold that critics were divided in their reviews 
of the Raft. However, in order to further discuss the critics’ reactions, the Romantic qualities of 
the painting should be mentioned. In this way, critics’ disapproval or praise can be understood 
better after explaining the innovation of the artwork.
One of the key properties in Romantic art is the importance of Nature. The men in the 
Raft were faced with the immense power of the seas; and also faced with human nature. Nature 
affects humans’ behavior, and so these men were forced to act in ways never thought possible. 
Since the Argus was depicted with the size of a speck, the sea appears even more expansive, and 
the possibility of the ship rescuing the castaways just as miniscule. If the viewer was concerned 
for these hailing men, when he or she stepped in front of the impressive painting, the observer 
may have felt like one of the survivors. The chances of the faraway ship seeing the raft would 
have been slim and while hope was there, so was disappointment.
Another Romantic idea was the nostalgia for the past. As Gericault had visited Italy, and 
studied Michelangelo, Raphael, and other great Italian painters, his figures in the Raft, recall 
these influences. As the artist painted the large figures, they have the build of sculptures. Toned 
and brawny, these are the survivors; quite different compared to the way the actual starved and 
dirty castaways looked when they were saved. The colors and shadows highlight the figures even 
more so. The motions of their actions were emphasized by the odd studio-like lighting.69 As the 
main figure at the top of the pyramid of sailors attempts to hail the speck, all the bodies are 
twisting and directed toward the point in the horizon. These bodies were most likely inspired by 
Michelangelo’s use of gigantism, or the increase in body proportions, as the figures are so large 
and muscular. There was also an influence of Peter Paul Rubens’ use of multiple forms working 
together.70 Using these masters’ works as inspiration, the Romantic nostalgia for antiquity was 
achieved after recalling the Renaissance and Baroque art periods.
Ibid, 90.
Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 184.
Ibid, 189.
Ibid, 192.
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With a sense of adventure and danger, The Raft o f the Medusa was a grand example of 
Romanticism. After eighteen months of constant work, the piece was finished.71 The public 
reaction to the painting was quite curious. The Salon of 1819 was strikingly similar to the Salon 
of 1814; both years observed the return of the monarchy. In charge of the biggest exhibition 
since the Bonaparte ruled were both the director of the Royal Museum, Comte de Forbin, and the 
secretary-general of the Musee du Louvre, Vicomte de Sennones. They wanted the theme of the 
1819’s exhibition to focus on the triumphs of the royal government. It is interesting that, while 
he was supportive of the monarchy, Forbin was actually friends with Vernet and the artist’s 
group. As artists began to enter their works, many paintings dealing with mythology or classical 
themes were rejected. This was evidence that there was censorship against most subject matter 
that could allude to Napoleon or the empire. However, Gericault’s piece was still accepted even 
though it was clearly a piece about the Meduse scandal. Boime believes that there had to be a 
“token” liberal picture allowed in the Salon.72 Another possible reason for why the Raft was 
admitted may be that since Gericault was part of Vernet’s circle, Forbin must have been 
acquainted with Gericault. This association may have opened a spot in an otherwise exclusive 
exhibition.
In either case, those in charge knew that the Raft made some sort of statement, and 
wished to suppress it slightly. The original title, The Raft o f the Medusa, was listed in the Salon 
Catalogue as “Scene of Shipwreck”. Almost everyone knew what particular shipwreck it 
depicted. The response to the painting varied between artistic oppositions and political 
oppositions.
There were some reviewers, like Landon writing in Annales du Musee, who did not 
appreciate the painting because the subject matter was not appropriate for a canvas that large. 
Landon was upset that Gericault had chosen such a dreadful scene to depict and he believed no 
one would want to buy the painting. Why would anyone buy a work that constantly reminded the 
viewer of despair and horror? This would be an especially important question considering the 
royal funding. Landon believed that, “history painting was designed to perpetuate the memory of 
elevating events that were of general interest (such as a coronation) or emotions whose 
description would be of general benefit (patriotism or piety).” 73 To Landon, there was no point 
in painting such a sad piece that did not “elevate” the viewer. On the contrary, the shipwreck was 
startling news and was probably of great interest to the audience. Emotions run deep through the 
painting, and while there were certain pressing issues addresses, there was also a sense of hope 
and the strength of humankind to survive. Compositionally, some critics did not think the somber 
tones were agreeable; the “blackness” was too much.74 However, this “blackness” may have 
been due to the placement of the Raft. Gericault made the mistake of hanging the painting high 
above one of the leading doors into the Salon; the already somber colors appeared to darken the 
higher it rose.75 Other reviewers thought that the figures were arranged in an “obviously 
pyramidal” fashion, or that the work had “lack of a ‘centre.’” Critics disagreed with each other, 
of course.
7‘ Ibid, 185.
 Boime, Albert. Art in an Age o f Counterrevolution, 1815-1848, 145.
73 Wright, Beth S. Painting and History during the French Restoration: Abandoned by the Past. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997, 148.
74 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 189.
75 Ibid, 188.
76 Ibid, 189.
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Those who did enjoy the so-called “pyramidal” structure and the center of the Raft, which 
the other reviewers apparently overlooked, praised Gericault’s composition. They found the 
figures compelling and moving. The Comte O’Mahony was a writer for the Conservateur and 
wrote how the changing of the title of the painting in the Salon catalogue did not hide the actual 
event depicted. He commended Gericault’s brash brushstrokes and the vigor it expressed. The 
overall color of the piece was appropriate for the subject matter. Overall, O’Mahony said of the 
painting “What a hideous spectacle but what beautiful picture.”77 The scene was powerful 
without the extra layer of political theories because the vision itself spoke of all the horrors in 
life. This idea fascinated many of the general audience.
For the reviews that focused on the political implications, there were two sides: royalists 
and the left-wing liberals. Some royalists were upset that the men in the painting had nothing to 
denote class or nationality. Without such indicators, they were unable to understand the supposed 
message of the piece.78 Most royalist reviewers did not sympathize with the victims of the 
shipwreck, and instead believed Gericault failed to stir up pity using the images of agony. These 
wounded men were being used as “misguided attempt on the part of ‘an obscure circle of a 
despised party’ to gain the benevolent attention of the throne and of legitimism”.79 Instead of 
seeing the men on the raft as victims, he saw them as objects used to gain the acceptance of the 
royalist opinion. Gericault painted in order to stir emotions within the audience, but the royalist 
side thought it was a device to gain support for the opposition.
The opposition, on the other hand, was supportive of the artist’s subject matter and the 
political issues it raised. Henri de Latouche was appalled by the change in title and accused the 
royal jury for hiding the incident for which the government was responsible. De Latouche was, 
unlike the royalist critic, compassionate toward the castaways. Another writer, this one for Le 
Constitutionnel, was greatly affected by the Raft and formed a parallel between the castaways 
and Napoleonic veterans. Seeing the Legion of Honor on the “Father’s” chest, the critic was 
grateful of the link between the castaways and the soldiers.80 It is interesting to note that some of 
the royalist critics missed the Legion of Honor. Both groups were forgotten and abandoned, left 
to survive with nothing. However, they were still beautiful and strong throughout their situations.
The general public was “disturbed and fascinated” by the Raft. In fact, as Etienne 
Delecluze, an art critic, recalled the Salon of 1819 years later, he stated that the Raft had 
“extraordinary success” as it stirred up many reactions.82 Compositionally, it was a break from 
the Neo-Classical school of Jacques-Louis David. It was bold and emotional. These men were 
fighting to survive, and the viewer was almost forced to feel the same. The horrors of the Raft 
were enticing to the society that was used to visiting morgues and frightening shows. Now they 
could feel as if they were a part of a tragedy as they stood at the base of the outspread canvas.
Conclusion
Gericault was seriously injured in a horseback-riding accident that left him weak and 
feeble. He never fully recovered and passed away the twenty-sixth of January, 1824. He was 
thirty-two and four months old.83 Even though he died so young, Gericault left an enormous 
mark on Romantic art. Interested in current events, his works constantly dealt with modem topics
77 Boime, Albert. Art in an Age o f Counterrevolution, 1815-1848, 147.
78 Grigsby, Darcy Grimaldo. Extremities: Painting Empire in Post-Revolutionary France, 220.
79 Boime, Albert. Art in an Age o f Counterrevolution, 1815-1848, 148.
80 Ibid, 147-148.
81 Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault: His Life and Work, 188.
82 Ibid, 191.
83 Ibid, 279.
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and issues. From his first painting in the Salon of 1812, the Charging Chasseur, where he 
depicted how society viewed Napoleon and his armies as valiant and unstoppable, to the 
Wounded Cuirassier in the Salon of 1816 where he expressed the uncertainty of the people to the 
new government, Gericault was not afraid to paint what he desired. While he was from a wealthy 
class, this did not hinder his ability to feel compassion for the veterans, painters, and writers. As 
he grew up in constantly shifting political times, his politics were also slightly affected, mostly 
through the influence of his friends.
As he changed, so did society with him. French individuals must have constantly worried 
about what would happen to their country next. Would the emperor come again or would the 
monarchy finally be stable? Their future was unclear, and so they attempted to entertain 
themselves by transforming death into a form of entertainment, rather than worry about the 
future. While the Romantic Movement had not yet become popular in France, peoples’ tastes 
were on the verge of change. They were already fascinated with the beauty of the “sublime.”
Gericault was interested in the beauty of the horrible. His morbid still-lifes were rendered 
with care and not exaggerated with drama. After seeing and sketching the suicide of his friend, 
he knew the power of emotion would translate beautifully into art. Combined with his renewed 
love of modem subjects, his final Salon entry in 1819 was to be his masterpiece. Once he heard 
the story of the castaways of La Meduse, abandoned by their royalist captain, and the horrors 
they went through, the painter knew what the topic would be for his greatest work. The Raft o f 
the Medusa was an intimidating piece to stand before. The audience was struck with not only the 
size, the surprising light, and the color, but the realistic men who were portrayed. These men 
were united in pain, hope, and uncertainty.
The “Father” was perhaps one of the most disturbing characters as he was beyond hope. 
Instead of rejoicing at the sight of rescue, he was lost in his own mind. Whether by madness or 
grief or both, he was unable to be rescued. Recalling Count Ugolino, he represents the 
cannibalism and murder that occurred during the real shipwreck. The “Father” had been driven 
to eat his own kind, perhaps his own kin, identical to Ugolino. Whether Gericault intended it or 
not, the “Father” could also represent the type of struggle to survive in France at the time.
As the Hundred Days and White Terror showed, many persons would perish before there 
was a glimpse or sighting of peace. As the suicide rates were always high, many Parisians were 
growing despondent and may have wished for an end to the suffering. When the French audience 
gazed upon the Raft, they may have understood a touch of what the castaways felt. If the viewer 
was not sympathetic to the raw emotion in the painting, then he or she would at least notice how 
different the work was compared to past exhibition pieces. Gericault was a Romantic artist who 
was able to have his daring works presented before those who would debate and contemplate on 
the compositions and subjects. Influenced and influencing, The Raft o f the Medusa represents 
emotion, ambition, and French society.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 1 124
Bibliography
Adams, Laurie Schneider. A History of Western Art Revised. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill,
2008.
Alhadeff, Albert. The Raft o f the Medusa: Gericault, Art, and Race. Munich: Prestel Verlag,
2002.
Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina. “Gericault's Severed Heads and Limbs: The Politics and 
Aesthetics of the Scaffold.” The Art Bulletin 74, No. 4, 1992. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3045912.
Berger, Klaus. Gericault and his Work. Translated by Winslow Ames. Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1955.
Boime, Albert. Art in an Age of Counterrevolution, 1815-1848. Vol. 3. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2004.
Brejon de Lavergnee, Amaud, Marie-Claude Chaudonneret and others. French Painting 1774- 
1830: The Age of Revolution. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975.
Bris, Michel Le. Romantics and Romanticism. New York: Rizzoli International Publications,
Inc., 1981.
“Chiarscuro,” An Encyclopaedia Britannica Company: Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/chiaroscuro
Clement, Charles. Gericault Etude Biographique Et Critique Avec Le Catalogue Raisonne 
D e’Loevre Du Maitre. Paris: Didier & Cie, Libraires-Editeurs, 1879.
Cohen, Margaret Cohen, Christopher Prendergast. Spectacles o f Realism: Body, Gender, and 
Genre. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1995.
Eitner, Lorenz. Gericault. Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1971.
— . Gericault: His Life and Work. London: Orbis Publishing, 1983.
— . Gericault's Raft of the Medusa. London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1972.
Foucault, Michel. History o f Madness. Ed. Jean Khalfa, Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean 
Khalfa. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
Furst, Lilian R. “Romanticism in Historical Perspective”. Comparative Literature Studies 5, No. 2, 1968.
http ://www ,j stor. org/stable/40467744.
Gilman, Sander L. Ph.D., Seeing the Insane. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in association 
with Bunner/Mazel, Inc., 1982.
Grigsby, Darcy Grimaldo. Extremities: Painting Empire in Post-Revolutionary France. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
Higonnet, Anne, Patrice Higonnet and Margaret Higonnet. “Facades: Walter Benjamin's Paris”.
Critical Inquiry 10, No. 3, 1984, p. 408-413, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343300.
"Legion of Honour." 2010. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/335043/Legion-of-Honour.
Mast, Rein van der. “Regimental History,” http://www.tentpegging.nl/kurassiers/
Schwartz, Vanessa R. Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-Siecle Paris. Los 
Angeles: University o f California Press, Ltd., 1998.
Symmons, Sarah. “Gericault, Flaxman, and ‘Ugolino’ ”. The Burlington Magazine 115, No. 847,
1973. http://www.jstor.org/stable/877443.
Weiner, Dora B. “Review: [Untitled]”. The American Historical Review 84, No. 5, 1979, p 1393- 
1394, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1861556.
Wright, Beth S. Painting and History During the French Restoration: Abandoned by the Past.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 1 125
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Yates, Frances A., “Transformations o f Dante’s Ugolino”. Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes 14, No. 1/2, 1951, http://www.jstor.org/stable/750354.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 1 126
Book Review I
Realistic Visionary: A Portrait of George Washington 
By Peter Henriques
Reviewed by John Prendergast ‘10
In Realistic Visionary: A Portrait o f George Washington, Peter Henriques 
attempts to “humanize Washington without diminishing him” (Preface xii). After all, 
much has been written about our first President over the past two-hundred and thirty- 
three years. In this vein, authors have often portrayed Washington in a gloomy light, 
noting his dry personality and his inability to handle criticism. While these portrayals do 
hold some water, it is unfair to ignore the rest of the facts which shed light on 
Washington’s insurmountable character—as a soldier, as a president, and as a husband. 
Thus, Henriques offers a comprehensive examination of Washington’s private and public 
life to prove that our first President was truly a “realistic visionary” who was designing a 
nation for the “millions unborn” (xii).
At the outset, Henriques examines the young, athletic Colonel Washington during 
his service under General Braddock in the French and Indian War. Washington was an 
ambitious young man and his desire for honor and glory is a theme which stretched 
throughout the course of his life. In search for honor and glory, however, Washington 
sometimes displayed an extreme lack of judgment. In one such example, Washington 
ordered an assault on the French diplomatic party known as the Jumonville Affair which 
spurred many to call Washington a murderer; this event also led to the outbreak of the 
war and is best summed up by Voltaire’s famous quotation: “a shot fired in the 
wilderness set the world ablaze.” Washington’s lack of judgment continued when he gave 
Braddock bad advice at the Battle of the Wilderness by splitting the advancing British 
army into two divisions—this decision turned out to be “one of the great British disasters 
of the eighteenth century” (9). Despite these unforeseeable results, Washington went on 
to show tremendous leadership on the battlefield as evident when General Braddock fell 
prey to enemy fire. This display of character led Washington to request the King’s 
commission and a promotion in rank, a request which was denied countless times.
Feeling extremely unappreciated, Washington chose to retire from military life at the age 
of twenty-six.
Washington became further angered with Great Britain a few years later when 
laws were passed which hindered his ability to advance his agricultural business. With a
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rapidly growing discontent toward Great Britain, George Washington began to delve into 
the Radical Whig message of Britain’s evident tyrannical plans to enslave the colonists.
In light of these developments yet acting visibly reluctant, George Washington ended his 
retirement and accepted the nomination to be the commander-in-chief of the Continental 
Army. However, Henriques claims Washington would not have worn his military 
uniform when he showed up to Congress if he really did not want the nomination. 
Additionally, Washington neither suggested to Congress other possible candidates for the 
job nor did he accept a stipend for his services. By doing this, Washington demonstrated 
that he could handle power and authority in a responsible manner.
Washington emerged from the Revolutionary War as the “unrivaled hero and 
savior of his country” (45) and in 1789 he was unanimously elected as the first President 
of the United States. In terms of assessing his Presidency, Henriques acknowledges that 
Washington had very limited resources at his disposal yet he made do and got the country 
headed in the right direction. With that said, Washington’s Presidency contained many 
crises which directly impacted various people within his administration. For one, the 
country was suffering extensively in terms of finances as there was a mounting war debt, 
and thus Washington relied heavily on Alexander Hamilton, a fellow Federalist who also 
sought honor and glory. Washington made Hamilton his Secretary of the Treasury, a job 
through which Hamilton successfully assumed states’ war debt and established a 
powerful national bank. Henriques brilliantly refers to Hamilton as “the indispensable 
man to the ‘Indispensable Man’.” Without Hamilton, Washington’s Presidency very well 
may have ended differently. Unfortunately, Washington did not have the same outgoing 
relationship with his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson. Although both men 
maintained a mutual respect for one another, Jefferson was furious over Washington’s 
support of the 1795 Jay Treaty which essentially acted as an appeasement toward Great 
Britain—Jefferson saw the treaty as treason that shut down any attempt at a Franco- 
American alliance. This, along with the 1796 “Mazzei letter” where Jefferson bashed 
Washington’s old age and even more senile advisors, led to the complete rupture in 
relationship between Washington and Jefferson.
Moving away from the military and political spectrum, Henriques studies 
Washington’s triangular love relationship with Sally Fairfax and Martha Custis. 
Washington was engaged to Martha but, according to various letter correspondences, was 
deeply in love with Sally, a black-haired beauty who tended to Washington when he fell 
severely ill in 1757. Henriques’ quotation best describes Washington’s feelings about the 
situation: “George Washington was many things, but one thing he was not, and would not 
be, was a Puritan” (74). Washington was in love with someone other than his fiancee and 
he was not afraid to proclaim that to Sally. With that said, Martha was truly the love of 
Washington’s life and he understood this. His marriage to Martha in 1759 not only 
provided Washington with financial security but also provided him with psychic 
security—“[Martha] gave him the type of unconditional support and love that his 
personality, perhaps in part because of his difficult childhood, seemed so desperately to 
need” (91). After all, she kept her husband company during the grueling winters at Valley 
Forge, tended to Mount Vernon while her husband was absent for long periods of time, 
and reluctantly relocated with her husband when he accepted the Presidency because she 
understood his duties to the country. None of this went unrecognized by Washington as
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Henriques claims that “few men...are fortunate enough to have had such a loving and 
devoted wife” (104).
As Henriques nears the end of his biographical account, he examines 
Washington’s views on slavery and religion. Washington was bom in Virginia, a slave 
society where 40% of the population were slaves for life (146). He had many slaves on 
his estate at Mount Vernon and he worked them hard. However, Washington referred to 
his slaves as his family and he recognized that they were emotional beings just as whites 
were. If a slave was ill, Washington would not force them to work but rather, he would 
supply the slave with medical attention. Over time, Washington slowly grew to see 
problems with slavery because the concept violated basic constitutional principles and, 
therefore, Washington freed his slaves in his final will. In terms of religion, many groups 
try to claim George Washington as their own. However, the truth is Washington was not 
a very religious person; granted, he believed in a higher-being which he called 
“Providence” and he believed in a form of afterlife. Still, Washington lacked 
religiousness on his deathbed. Washington was not afraid to die—it was something which 
he readily embraced. For Washington, it all came down to secular immortality—he 
wanted to be remembered for what he accomplished in life. As long as he would be 
remembered by the “millions unborn,” he would gracefully and willingly pass on into the 
afterlife.
In his work, Peter Henriques fittingly uses many themes throughout Washington’s 
life as a way to understand his character. A Professor of History Emeritus at George 
Mason University, Henriques avoids a blow by blow, chronological account of 
Washington’s life and, by doing so, effectively allows the reader to see and comprehend 
Washington’s character among varying avenues of interpretation. At the outset,
Henriques states that he wants “to humanize Washington without diminishing him.” To a 
great extent the author accomplishes this feat—Henriques makes many concessions along 
the way but that is because he wants the full truth to be known; sometimes the truth can 
hurt, sure, but in doing so the reader is made available to the greater picture. For example, 
George Washington was almost certainly a racist. Henriques acknowledges that he was 
“an elitist by temperament and upbringing... no doubt, he had an engrained sense of racial 
superiority” (155). With that said, Henriques uses this foundation to establish that 
Washington was most impressive in how his attitudes changed over time as evident when 
he freed his slaves. Moreover, Henriques demonstrates that he is not afraid to use 
evidence from other scholars’ works, along with his own knowledge, to corroborate many 
of the points he makes throughout his account. His range of reference spans among great 
minds such as Joseph Ellis, Ron Chernow, and Paul Longmore to name a few. After all, 
“humanizing” Washington with evidence from only one author is an unbelievable task 
and, thus, Henriques successfully avoids any kind of egotistical trap by citing authors 
who are able to convey a certain detail more effectively or succinctly than he.
Unfortunately, there are some students of history who maintain that George 
Washington was solely a dry personality who could not handle criticism. Peter Henriques 
successfully establishes, through his work Realistic Visionary, that claims such as these 
are erroneous. Washington was a man of exponential character who resisted power’s 
temptation on many instances. He proved early on that he could handle responsibility 
and, by reluctantly accepting nominations, he implicitly asserted that he had no interest in 
establishing a dictatorship. He was dedicated to the experiment of republican government
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and he set the precedent for term limits by engaging in the peaceful exchange from one 
presidential administration to the next. William Shakespeare once said “he was a man, take him 
for all in all...I shall not look upon his like again.” Shakespeare’s carefully chosen words 
emulate the sentiment created by our first President. And arguably most essential founding 
father. He was the “Indispensable Man” who combined reason and emotion to contribute to the 
fabric of what we can now call the most powerful, democratic nation in the world—the United 
States of America.
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